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Essays on Inventory Management and Object Allocation
Thiam Hui Lee
This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first, we establish a framework for
proving equivalences between mechanisms that allocate indivisible objects to agents. In
the second, we study a newsvendor model where the inventory manager has access to
two experts that provide advice, and examine how and when an optimal algorithm can
be efficiently computed. In the third, we study classical single-resource capacity alloca-
tion problem and investigate the relationship between data availability and performance
guarantees.
We first study mechanisms that solve the problem of allocating indivisible objects to
agents. We consider the class of mechanisms that utilize the Top Trading Cycles (TTC)
algorithm (these may differ based on how they prioritize agents), and show a general
approach to proving equivalences between mechanisms from this class. This approach is
used to show alternative and simpler proofs for two recent equivalence results for mecha-
nisms with linear priority structures. We also use the same approach to show that these
equivalence results can be generalized to mechanisms where the agent priority structure
is described by a tree.
Second, we study the newsvendor model where the manager has recourse to advice,
or decision recommendations, from two experts, and where the objective is to minimize
worst-case regret from not following the advice of the better of the two agents. We show
the model can be reduced to the class machine-learning problem of predicting binary se-
quences but with an asymmetric cost function, allowing us to obtain an optimal algorithm
by modifying a well-known existing one. However, the algorithm we modify, and conse-
quently the optimal algorithm we describe, is not known to be efficiently computable,
because it requires evaluations of a function v which is the objective value of recursively
defined optimization problems. We analyze v and show that when the two cost param-
eters of the newsvendor model are small multiples of a common factor, its evaluation is
computationally efficient. We also provide a novel and direct asymptotic analysis of v
that differs from previous approaches. Our asymptotic analysis gives us insight into the
transient structure of v as its parameters scale, enabling us to formulate a heuristic for
evaluating v generally. This, in turn, defines a heuristic for the optimal algorithm whose
decisions we find in a numerical study to be close to optimal.
In the third essay, we study the classical single-resource capacity allocation problem.
In particular, we analyze the relationship between data availability (in the form of demand
samples) and performance guarantees for solutions derived from that data. This is done
by describing a class of solutions called ε-backwards accurate policies and determining a
suboptimality gap for this class of solutions. The suboptimality gap we find is in terms
of ε and is also distribution-free. We then relate solutions generated by a Monte Carlo
algorithm and ε-backwards accurate policies, showing a lower bound on the quantity of
data necessary to ensure that the solution generated by the algorithm is ε-backwards
accurate with a high probability. Combining the two results then allows us to give a
lower bound on the data needed to generate an α-approximation with a given confidence
probability 1− δ. This lower bound is polynomial in the number of fares, M , and 1/α.
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This dissertation studies facets of three major problems of Operations Research: the prob-
lem of allocating indivisible objects, the newsvendor problem, and the capacity allocation
problem.
In Chapter 2, we study mechanisms for allocating indivisible objects to agents. These
mechanisms are algorithms that find matchings between agents and objects given agents’
(strict) preference orderings over the objects. In particular, we consider the class of
mechanisms that use the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) algorithm, which we call TTC mech-
anisms. Part of the specification of any TTC mechanism is a prioritization over agents
for each object that indicate which agent has ownership over that object under what
conditions. Allocations are found by serially conducting exchanges of owned objects be-
tween unmatched agents, such that each agent involved in an exchange ends up with his
favorite unmatched object at that time. Such exchanges are found are by forming graphs
involving unmatched agents and finding cycles within these graphs. Members of this class
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of mechanisms differ on how agents are prioritized for each object, which influences what
cycles may appear in the graph.
We establish an approach to proving equivalences between TTC mechanisms, i.e. a
method of showing two mechanisms from this class generate the same matchings with the
same probabilities. This approach describes the pair of mechanisms using recursion, and
show that under certain conditions, the terms in the recursion due to cycles common to
both mechanisms have the same contribution while terms due to cycles appearing in one
mechanism but not the other have zero overall contribution. The latter is shown using a
simple bijection.
Using our proof approach, we are able to show alternative and concise proofs for two
recent equivalence results for TTC mechanisms with agent priorities specified by linear
structures, i.e. agent priorities for each object is described by a linear ordering (which
may not necessarily be complete). Additionally, we use the same framework to generalize
these equivalence results to a class of mechanisms that use the TTC algorithm where
agent priorities are specified by tree structures.
In Chapter 3, we study the newsvendor problem with expert advice. The newsvendor
problem is one where an inventory manager has to decide a stocking level for goods he
is selling, and, depending on the demand, incurs an overage cost if he stocks too much
and an underage cost if he stocks too little. We look at a multi-period version of the
problem where the goods are perishable and where the manager has access to advice
about stocking levels given by experts. The manager wishes to minimize his regret of not
having followed the advice of the best expert, i.e. to minimize the cost he would have
incurred he had followed the best expert’s advice throughout minus the cost he actually
incurred. In particular, his objective to minimize the worst-case regret.
We show that this model can be reduced to a problem of predicting sequences with ex-
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pert advice, a widely-studied problem in machine-learning and computer science, with an
asymmetric linear cost function (i.e. with a different overage and underage cost). More-
over, we are able to modify an algorithm for the sequence prediction problem with linear
costs so that it is optimal for the newsvendor context with asymmetric costs as well. How-
ever, computing decisions using this algorithm requires evaluating a function v described
by optimal value of a recursively defined optimization problem, and the question whether
v could be evaluated efficiently was previously unanswered. Analyzing v comprises the
main focus of the chapter, where we attempt to answer this question. First, we find that
v can be efficiently computed when the overage and underage costs are small multiples of
some common factor, and even more efficiently if one is a multiple of the other. Second,
we analyze the asymptotic behavior of v, which leads to a heuristic for v and consequently
a heuristic algorithm for the manager’s problem.
And in Chapter 4, we consider the problem of managing non-replenishable inventory
of a single resource that is sold in stages with a different price in each stage, where
the manager’s problem is to maximize revenue by controlling in each stage how much
inventory to reserve for future stages. This is a classical problem in revenue management
typically called the single-resource capacity allocation problem. We study the relationship
between the availability of data (in the form of demand samples) and performance for this
problem. This study is done in two parts.
The first part examines a parametrized class of solutions to the problem, called “ε-
backwards accurate” policies, and show a suboptimality bound on its performance in
terms of ε that does not depend on the distribution of demands.
To connect this result to data availability, we show that a Monte-Carlo algorithm can
generate an ε-backwards accurate policy with a given confidence probability if sufficiently
many data samples are used as input to the algorithm. This allows us to connect a desired
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performance level, the confidence probability of achieving that performance level and the
number of samples that the Monte Carlo algorithm needs to find such a solution.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Allocation of indivisible objects
The problem of allocating indivisible objects is a problem where a number of indivisible
objects are to be assigned to an equal number of agents, with each agent receiving exactly
one object and without monetary exchange between the agents. Note that this problem is
also commonly referred to as the assignment or housing allocation problem. This problem
formulation has found use in several applications where allocation of resources should take
place without the exchange of money, including allocating on-campus housing for students
([3],[20]), placing students in public schools ([1]), and designing kidney exchanges ([71]).
This problem is normally framed as one of how to ensure fairness and efficiency (in
terms of social welfare). Agents are typically assumed to have strict individual preferences
over the objects: for each agent, his utility of being assigned different objects is compared
using a strict ordering of the objects (which may be unique to him) and not with a
numerical scale; this is also called an ordinal preference ordering. For example, an agent
has preferences a  b  c over the objects {a, b, c}, so he prefers a to b to c. The objective
is to find an algorithm, usually called a mechanism in this context, that finds a matching
between the agents and the objects satisfying certain fairness criteria while being efficient.
It is not difficult to see that deterministic mechanisms suffer from issues of fairness (for
example, two differently labeled but otherwise identical agents must necessarily be treated
differently by a deterministic mechanism), so it is common for mechanisms that are studied
to use randomness. This problem is therefore called the random assignment problem.
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Early literature considered two models: the housing market model introduced by Shap-
ley and Scarf [78] in which each agent is already endowed with an object (and each agent
is given top priority for the object he is endowed with); or the house allocation model
introduced by Hylland and Zeckhauser [43] that had no endowments. There is a vast
literature on both models at this point.
For the housing market model, Shapley and Scarf [78] propose an algorithm, called
the top trading cycles (TTC) algorithm that computes a unique reallocation of objects to
agents based on agent preferences and their endowments. The TTC algorithm does the
following: at any juncture, it maintains a graph with agents as nodes, and has an arc from
agent i to agent j if j is endowed with i’s most preferred remaining object; this graph can
be shown to contain a cycle (possibly a self-loop); a cycle is chosen and every agent in
that cycle is matched with his most preferred remaining object, after which the matched
agents and objects are removed, and the graph is updated and the procedure is repeated if
any agents and objects remain. Shapley and Scarf showed that this algorithm computes
a matching from the core of the associated cooperative game. Roth and Postlewaite
[73] later showed that the core is unique. Additionally, under the scenario where agents
are to required to report their preferences, Roth [72] showed that the TTC algorithm is
strategyproof (each agent has no incentive to lie about his preferences) and later Bird [12]
showed that it is in fact group-strategyproof (there is no incentive for any group of agents
to collaborate and lie about their preferences).
For the housing allocation model, one natural and very common mechanism in prac-
tice is random priority (RP), also called random serial dictatorship, first studied in the
literature by Zhou [89]. In this mechanism, a random ordering is drawn and each agent
is allowed to choose the object they want assigned to them in this order. The outcome of
this mechanism is Pareto efficient, strategy-proof and exhibits equal treatment of agents
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 6
with identical preferences.
These two models were unified by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez [2], who described an
algorithm called random endowment (RE) that utilized the TTC algorithm but generated
endowments by choosing uniformly at random from all the possible ones. They were able
to show that RE and RP output the same random matchings with the same probability,
i.e. that RE and RP were equivalent mechanisms.
Since then, there have been several papers that showed the equivalence of mechanisms
that are generalizations of RE and RP ([66],[28],[16]). We develop a proof technique in
Chapter 2 that unifies and generalizes these results.
For a more in-depth overview of literature on allocating indivisible objects, we refer
the readers to a recent survey by Sonmez and Unver [80]. Interested readers can also refer
to Pathak [65] for applications of these ideas to student placement.
1.2.2 The newsvendor problem
The origins of the newsvendor problem can be dated to Edgeworth [26] who considered
the problem of how a bank should set its level of cash reserves to cover withdrawals by its
customers. The classic paper by Arrow et al. [4] later considered a more general model,
which we describe here.
There is an inventory manager who has to decide how much to stock of a good he sells.
There is a purchase cost, c, for each unit of inventory he decides to stock and a price, p,
the customers pay for each unit of inventory they demand, and the manager wishes to
maximize revenue. This can be equivalently modeled as the scenario where there is no
cost for deciding how much to stock, but instead there is an overage cost, h, for each unit
of inventory stocked in excess of demand and an underage cost, b, for each unit of demand
that cannot be satisfied due to insufficient inventory, and where the manager’s objective
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is to minimize cost. (It is not difficult to see that we can relate the two by writing h = c
and b = p− c.) We consider the second alternative.
Let the manager stocking decision be y and the customers’ demand be D. Then the
manager’s incurred cost is
λ = h(y −D)+ + b(D − y)+.
Arrow et al. [4] and Dworetzky et al. [25] show that if the demand is stochastic






Instead of minimizing expected cost, the manager could try to minimize worst-case
performance, typically called a minimax approach. Possible rationales for choosing such an
objective include risk-aversion or lack of knowledge about the distribution of the demand.
Scarf [74], and later Moon and Gallego [60] showed that if the demand has mean µ and
standard deviation σ > 0, the stocking quantity y that minimizes the manager’s cost










(This assumes that h < b, but the case where h > b has a similar form.)
Time can be incorporated into the model by considering demand arriving over a time
horizon with replenishments of inventory allowed. A common way to model this is to
segment the time horizon into contiguous time periods and consider each period a separate
newsvendor instance. Several variations are possible within this framework: unsatisfied
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demand in each period can either be lost or backlogged; goods can either be perishable
(they are can be sold only in the period they are received by the manager) or non-
perishable; the time taken between ordering and receiving goods, the lead time, can either
be negligible (i.e. instantaneous delivery) or be non-negligible (i.e. more than one period
or possibly stochastic); and there may be a fixed cost attached to each replenishment
order made.
The case where goods are non-perishable and unsatisfied demand is backlogged is well-
studied. Clark and Scarf [21] use dynamic programming to show that basestock policies,
where in each period there is a target stocking level that the inventory is replenished
to, are optimal. (Since then, basestock policies have been widely studied for many other
inventory models, see e.g. [44], [85], [27].) There have also been recent studies that take
a minimax approach to the multi-period problem ([31], [9], [10]).
In the case where goods are perishable, unsatisfied demand is lost, and there is no
lead time or fixed costs, the newsvendor instances in each period decouple and may be
optimized separately. We focus on this set up in Chapter 3, but with the following
additions: there are two experts who provide advice to the inventory manager in each
period; the manager’s objective is to minimize his regret of not taking the better expert’s
advice throughout the periods, against the worst-case realization of expert advice and
demand. Note that these additions prevent the newsvendor instances in each period from
being decoupled.
For more discussion on additional models for inventory control, we refer the reader to
Porteus [68] and Zipkin [90].
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1.2.3 The single-resource capacity allocation problem
The capacity allocation problem is one selling identical capacity of a resource over a finite
time horizon to various classes of demand who pay different prices (which we term fare
classes). (The canonical example of this problem is the sale of tickets for a single-leg
flight.) Demand for each fare class is stochastic and arrives sequentially, demand arrives
individually and not in batches, and no overbooking is allowed (i.e. we cannot sell more
than the capacity we have). The time horizon can thus be segmented into stages, with
only fare class i demand arriving in stage i, and fare classes arriving in decreasing order
(i.e. fare class i+ 1 arrives before fare class i). The manager seeks to maximize expected
revenue by deciding at each stage how much of the remaining capacity to reserve (or
protect) for sales in future stages. We call the vector of his decisions, p = (p1, p2, . . .), a
protection level policy, with the protection level pi referring the how to much capacity to
reserve for fare classes 1 through i.
As an example, we place this model within the context of a single-leg flight with two
fare classes: leisure travelers and business travelers. Leisure travelers are willing to buy
tickets earlier but are willing to pay less, while business travelers are apt to purchase tickets
closer to the flight but are willing to pay more. The manager decides some protection
level policy (p1), which indicates how much remaining capacity to reserve for the high-fare
class demand.
The earliest study of this problem dates to Littlewood [55], who examined the problem
of managing sales of capacity on a single-leg flight with two independent fare classes, low-
and high-fare and arriving in that order, and introduced a rule, commonly known as
Littlewood’s rule, for deciding at what capacity level to halt low-fare sales and only allow
high-fare ones. Derivations of this rule were later provided by Richter [69]. Note that
modeling low-fare before high-fare corresponds to a worst-case sequence of arrivals of
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fares.
The case with more than two fare classes (with fare classes arriving in ascending order
of fare price) was first considered by Belobaba [7], who extended Littlewood’s rule to the
EMSR method, a suboptimal but easily implementable policy that performs reasonably
well under certain distributions (see e.g. [87]) but not others (see e.g. [70]).
Characterizations of optimal policies and methods to compute them when the fare
classes are monotonically increasing in fares were later described in Curry [23], Wollmer
[87], and Brumelle and McGill [15]. In particular, they showed that protection level
policies are optimal when they satisfy the following characterization: if we let Di and fi
be fare class i demand and fare respectively and the number of classes be M + 1, optimal
protection policies (p∗1, p
∗















for all k = 1, . . . ,M.
This characterization of the optimal policy can be used to design a Monte Carlo algo-
rithm for generating policies from demand samples (historical or otherwise). The same
characterization was later exploited by Van Ryzin and McGill [83] to develop a stochastic
gradient ascent algorithm, where the ascent direction for pk in each iteration depended on
whether the event (D1 > p1, . . . ,
∑k
i=1Di > pk) was realized in that iteration’s demand
samples. Another stochastic gradient ascent algorithm was later developed by Kunnamkal
and Topaloglu [50], which utilized not the characterization above but arose instead from
a dynamic programming formulation of the problem.
The case when the fare classes are non-monotonic in their fares (so low-fare demand
need not necessarily arrive before high-fare demand) was studied by Robinson [70], who
showed protection level policies were still optimal in that setting, characterized the optimal
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policy, and provided a Monte Carlo algorithm that computed an optimal policy from
demand samples.
It is this last case of non-monotonic fare classes we consider in Chapter 4, where we
characterize the relationship between the number of samples available and the performance
achievable by a solution generated by the Monte Carlo algorithm described in Robinson
[70]. We note that our result is distinct from those of Van Ryzin and McGill [83] and
Kunnamkal and Topaloglu [50] because they obtain convergence rates (how fast solutions
converge to an optimal one) for their algorithms while we obtain sampling bounds (how
many demand samples are needed to achieve an approximation of a given performance
level with a given confidence probability).
There is also a wide range of models in the revenue management literature related to
the capacity allocation problem. Interested readers may refer to Talluri and van Ryzin
[82] for a discussion of these models.
1.3 Guide to reading the dissertation
The chapters are each self-contained, so they may be read independently. Furthermore,




In this chapter, we focus on the problem of allocating indivisible objects to agents, and
examine mechanisms that solve this problem. In particular, we establish an approach to
proving equivalences between mechanisms that allows us to give concise alternate proofs
for results from recent literature and generalize them to more general mechanisms.
2.1 Introduction
The problem of allocating a finite number of indivisible objects to a set of agents has been
studied extensively, since the pioneering work of Shapley and Scarf [78], and has served as
a useful model in many real-world settings such as the assignment of schools to students [1]
and the design of kidney exchanges [71]. The early literature was mostly on two distinct
models: the housing market model of Shapley and Scarf in which each agent was endowed
with an object; and the house allocation model, studied by Hylland and Zeckhauser [43]
in which there were no endowments. There is by now a well-developed literature on each
of these models as well as on a hybrid version, first proposed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and
So¨nmez [3], in which some—but not all—agents are endowed with objects.
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In this chapter our focus is exclusively on ordinal settings in which agents submit
strict preference orderings over the objects. Shapley and Scarf [78] formulated their hous-
ing market model in this setting, and described the top-trading cycle (TTC) algorithm
(attributed to Gale) that computes a unique reallocation of the objects to the agents.
Roth [72] showed that the resulting mechanism is strategyproof (submitting true prefer-
ence orderings is a dominant strategy for each agent) and Bird [12] showed that it is also
group strategyproof (submitting true preference orderings is a dominant strategy for any
group of agents); Roth and Postlewaite [73] showed that the core of the natural coop-
erative game associated with this problem is unique. Shapley and Scarf [78] had shown
the solution computed by their algorithm is in the core of the associated cooperative
game. For the house allocation problem, a fundamental mechanism in this setting is the
Random Priority (RP) mechanism: a random ordering of the agents is drawn, and the
agents are invited to choose objects in this order. The resulting allocation (for any given
ordering) is Pareto efficient, so the outcome of the mechanism can be thought of as a
lottery over Pareto efficient assignments. It is easy to see that RP is strategyproof and
treats equals equally: agents with identical preference orderings receive identical (proba-
bilistic) allocations. The literature on these problems evolved fairly independently until
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [2] thought of the following mechanism for the house allo-
cation problem: endow each agent with a random object, each possible endowment of
the objects to the agents equally likely; and find the unique reallocation given by the
TTC algorithm. They called this the random endowment (RE) mechanism. A natural
question is to understand the relationship between RP and RE. Somewhat surprisingly,
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [2] showed that these mechanisms are equivalent: given any
preference structure for the agents, RP and RE lead to the same probability distribution
over Pareto efficient assignments. Since their result, there have been a number of papers
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that establish the equivalence of seemingly different mechanisms for a variety of models
assignment models: For example, Pathak and Sethuraman [66] show that in assigning
students to schools (using the TTC mechanism), the mechanism in which all the schools
use the same (random) priority ordering of the agents is equivalent to the mechanism in
which every school generates its priority ordering randomly and independently.
Our work in this chapter is inspired by a recent paper of Carroll [16] that puts forth
a general framework that subsumes many (but not all) of the known equivalence results
in the literature. Specifically, Carroll introduces the notion of a priority framework in
which the priority orderings of the objects are specified in terms of “roles,” which are
placeholders for the agents. By picking a bijection from the set of roles to the set of agents,
we instantiate the priority framework, resulting in a priority ordering of the agents for
each object. Carroll showed that if the bijection from roles to agents is chosen uniformly at
random, and if the TTC algorithm is used to compute the allocation, then the outcome—a
probability distribution over matchings—is independent of the priority framework! The
equivalence of RP and RE follows because each of them can be modeled by a fixed priority
framework. Carroll also introduced a more general priority structure for the objects by
using an exogenous partition of the agents into groups. There is a fixed priority structure
for the objects in terms of the given groups, but each group is free to order its roles any
way it likes across the various objects. As before, the roles of each group are instantiated
by a random bijection to the agents in that group, and this is done independently for each
group. Carroll showed that the final outcome is the same regardless of how each group
orders its roles across the various objects. In proving his result, Carroll observed that the
straightforward counting approach of Pathak and Sethuraman [66] does not easily extend
to this model. Nevertheless Carroll used a combination of techniques and gave essentially
a bijective technique to prove his main result. In another recent paper, Ekici [28] proved
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a new equivalence result in the hybrid model where some (but not all) agents are endowed
with objects. For this model, Ekici showed the equivalence of a natural random priority
mechanism, first proposed by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [2], to a variant of the random
endowment mechanism in which some agents may be endowed with multiple objects and
others none; agents of the latter sort are nonetheless granted an “inheritance” right. We
defer the details of this mechanism to §2.4.1, but note that this result is neither subsumed
by Carroll’s general model, nor by a similar looking equivalence result of Pathak and
Sethuraman. Ekici’s proof is again bijective.
Motivated by these recent equivalence results we describe a general technique to prove
the equivalence of two mechanisms within a certain class (§2.3). Our approach is related
to that of Pathak and Sethuraman [66]: like that approach we rely on induction (on the
number of agents), and express the outcome of a mechanism in terms of its outcome on
smaller instances. Given two mechanisms, we focus on those terms that appear in one
but not the other, and argue that the overall contribution of such terms is zero. The
key difference is in the way this last fact is established. Pathak and Sethuraman used a
counting argument to do this, whereas we replace this counting argument with a simple
bijection. The advantage is that one can now apply this argument more broadly. In
particular, the results of Carroll [16], Ekici [28], and generalizations of these results can
all be established easily using our technique, see §2.4. In §2.5 we show how the same
technique can be used to prove equivalence results when the priority structures form an
inheritance tree in the sense of Papai [64]. Our main contribution therefore is a unified
approach that sheds light on all the equivalence results in the literature, in addition to
suggesting new ones.
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2.2 TTC Mechanisms
Let A denote the set of agents and S the set of objects, with |A| = |S|. Each agent has a
strict preference ordering over the objects. Each agent wishes to be assigned exactly one
object, and each object can be assigned to at most one agent. Our focus shall be on the
family of algorithms called top-trading cycles (TTC) invented by Gale and first described
by Shapley and Scarf [78]. This algorithm operates in phases; At the beginning of each
phase, there is a set of (remaining) agents, a set of (remaining) objects, and each object
has a top-priority agent (among the ones that remain). Consider the graph with a node
for each (remaining) agent, and an arc from node i to node k if agent i’s most preferred
object is one for which agent k has top priority. Note that self-loops are possible: an arc
(i, i) exists if agent i has the highest priority for his most-preferred (remaining) object.
This graph, referred to as the TTC graph, must have a cycle c (which may be simply a
self-loop), because every node has out-degree 1 and there are finitely many nodes. Every
agent in c is matched with the object he most prefers among the ones that remain; the
agents in c along with their matched objects are removed from the problem, and the top-
priority agent for each remaining object is updated if necessary. We will usually refer to
this process as clearing the cycle c. If any agents (equivalently objects) remain, the next
phase starts in which the same algorithm is applied to the remaining objects and agents;
Otherwise, all the agents have been matched and the algorithm terminates.
Note that we talk of the TTC family of algorithms rather than the TTC algorithm
because the final allocation depends on how the top priority agent for each object is
specified. Thus the mechanisms we discuss differ in how the agents are prioritized for each
object. The following two examples, which are well-known mechanisms in the literature,
give an idea of how mechanisms can differ within the framework just described. In each
case, the agents are assigned objects using the TTC algorithm, but applied to different
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priority profiles for the objects.
Example 2.2.1. Random Priority (RP). Let (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) be a permutation of the
agents chosen uniformly at random, that is, every permutation of the agents is equally
likely. Let i∗ be the smallest i for which agent σi still remains in the problem. Then,
the top-priority agent (in any phase) for every remaining object is σi∗. Equivalently, the
top-priority agent for every remaining object in phase k is the agent σk.
Example 2.2.2. Random Endowment (RE). Let (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) be a permutation of
the agents chosen uniformly at random, that is, every permutation of the agents is equally
likely. For each j = 1, 2, . . . , n, the top-priority agent for the j-th object is σj. Note that
if the j-th object still remains in the problem, so will agent σj, so every remaining object
will have a top-priority agent at every point in time.
For both RP and RE, the priority orderings of the objects are determined randomly,
so the outcome is a random matching, which can be described as a probability distribution
over perfect matchings, where a perfect matching refers to a matching between the full set
of agents and the full set of objects. This naturally leads us to the notion of equivalence
of mechanisms, defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.1. Two mechanisms are equivalent if for any instance, every perfect
matching occurs with the same probability under both mechanisms.
Although RP and RE look different and are described in different terms, they lead
to the same probability distribution over perfect matchings, as was shown independently
by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [2] and Knuth [49]. Thus, RP and RE are equivalent
mechanisms.
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2.3 Equivalence of Mechanisms: A general
approach
Recent results have shown equivalences between mechanisms that allow for more complex
priority structures [16, 28, 66]. We review in §2.4 two of these results and show how their
proofs can be simplified. We unify and generalize these recent results in §2.5, where we
formulate a model in which the priority structure for each object is given by an inheritance
tree. The proof technique in all our proofs is essentially the same, and is discussed here.
Recall that different mechanisms in the TTC family differ only in how the priority
structures for the various objects are determined. All the TTC mechanisms we consider
satisfy the following persistence property:
(i) Once an agent has top priority for an object, he retains it until he is matched (to
that object or a different one);
and the following inheritance property:
(ii) The top-priority agent for a remaining object at any time may depend only on the
set of remaining agents and objects as well as the partial matching guaranteed by
the all past cycles formed in the TTC graph.
Note that on a given priority profile for the objects it is possible for the corresponding
TTC graph for M to have multiple cycles; by property (i), however, any cycle that is
not cleared will persist in the TTC graph until it is cleared. This enables us to write the
outcome of mechanism M as a simple recursion. To do this, we first set up some notation.
Let M(A, pi) be the probability that mechanism M applied to the set of agents A
results in the matching pi.1 For any l ≥ 1, let ClM be the collection of l disjoint top-
1Strictly speaking, we should also specify the set of objects that are “available.” However the set of
available objects will be clear from the context, justifying the notation.
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trading cycles (also called a cycle product of size l) that could be simultaneously present
initially when mechanism M is used. Each cycle can be written in a canonical way: the
smallest-numbered agent in the cycle appears as the first agent in the cycle; for a cycle-
product of size l, we arrange the cycles in ascending order of the first agents. Note that
this representation is unique. For any cycle product c, let ν(c) be the induced matching,
and PM(c) be the probability that cycle product c is present in the TTC graph under
mechanism M. Finally, for matchings pi and pi′, pi′ ⊆ pi if pi′ is a submatching of pi (i.e.,
every matched pair in pi′ is also a matched pair in pi); in that case, pi \ pi′ denotes the







(−1)l−1PM(c) M(A \ c, pi \ ν(c)). (2.1)
Eq. (2.1) can be justified in a straightforward way using the inclusion-exclusion principle
and property (i).2 Note that the information about the cycles that have been cleared is
implicit in the definition of the residual problem.
As priority structures grow increasingly complex so does the behavior of the mech-
anism, so comparing different TTC mechanisms is not always easy. However, Eq. (2.1)
suggests a simple way to think about the equivalence of two TTC mechanisms. Suppose
there is another TTC mechanism M′ satisfying properties (i) and (ii) such that
(iii) every collection of cycles that could be simultaneously present in the TTC graph of
M can also be simultaneously present in the TTC graph of M′. That is, ClM ⊆ ClM′
for any l; and
(iv) for any c ∈ ⋃l≥1 ClM, PM(c) = PM′(c).
2We appeal to the inclusion-exclusion principle to avoid double-counting. Properties (i) and (ii)
together imply that the outcome of the mechanism does not depend on which subset of cycles of the TTC
graph is cleared during a phase of the TTC algorithm.



































(−1)l−1PM′(c) M′(A \ c, pi \ ν(c)), (2.2)
where the first term of the last equality follows from properties (iii) and (iv) of mechanism
M′.






(−1)l−1PM′(c) M′(A \ c, pi \ ν(c)) = 0. (2.3)







(−1)l−1PM(c) M′(A \ c, pi \ ν(c)).
Notice that this is exactly the recursion definingM(A, pi), assumingM(A′, pi′) = M′(A′, pi′)
for all A′ ( A and all matchings pi′ involving the agents in A′. This sets the stage for an
inductive proof.3
We shall therefore focus on proving (2.3), which we do using the following general
idea. For any c ∈ ⋃l≥1 ClM′ \ ClM pick two special agents x1 and x2 from c and see
3Any assumption on the priority structure for the problem involving the agents in A must be preserved
for the reduced problem A′. This is generally easily verified.
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how they appear in its canonical representation4: if x1 and x2 appear in the same cy-
cle, say (x1a0a1 . . . akx2b0b1 . . . bl), then split the cycle into two cycles (x1a0a1 . . . ak) and
(x2b0b1 . . . bl); if x1 and x2 appear in distinct cycles, say (x1a0a1 . . . ak) and (x2b0b1 . . . bl),
then merge the two cycles as (x1a0a1 . . . akx2b0b1 . . . bl). We call this the transformation
T applied to the cycle product c. Suppose that for any cycle product c ∈ ⋃l≥1 ClM′ \ ClM,
there is a method of picking the two agents x1 and x2 such that the following properties
hold:
(a) the choice of x1 and x2 is depends only on the set of agents in the cycle product,
and not on its cycle structure;
(b) T (c) ∈ ⋃l≥1 ClM′ \ ClM, and PM′(T (c)) = PM(c).
We record a few properties of this transformation T : first, T (T (c)) = c, so that T is self-
inverse; second, T (c) has one less or one more cycle than does c; and finally, the matchings
induced by c and T (c) are identical, therefore the residual problems are identical as well.
These observations collectively imply that T is a bijection between {c ∈ ClM′ \ ClM : ν(c) ⊆
pi, l odd} and {c ∈ ClM′ \ ClM : ν(c) ⊆ pi, l even}. Furthermore, PM′(T (c)) = PM′(c) for any












PM′(c) M′(A \ c, pi \ ν(c)),
we note that its validity is immediate from the preceding discussion: for each term in-
volving a cycle product c on the left, there is a corresponding term involving T (c) on the
right such that the expressions are identical, and vice-versa.
4In all the applications of this idea, every cycle c ∈ ⋃l≥1 ClM′ \ ClM has at least two candidates for the
roles of x1 and x2, so this can always be done.
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Example 2.3.1. Consider an instance with 4 agents, with A = {1, 2, 3, 4} and S =
{a, b, c, d}, where the agents have strict preferences given by Table 2.1.
1 2 3 4
a b c a
b a d c
c c a b
d d b d
Table 2.1: Agent preferences for Example 2.3.1, from most- to least-preferred.
Let RP be M and RE be M′. Consider the sets of cycle products under RP. These are
simply
C1M = {(1), (2), (3), (4)},
C2M = C3M = C4M = ∅
Similarly, the sets of cycle products under RE are
C1M′ = CM ∪ {(12), (13), (23), (24), (34), (123), (132), (234), (243)};
C2M′ = {(1)(2), (1)(3), (2)(3), (2)(4), (3)(4), (1)(23), (13)(2), (2)(34),
(12)(3), (24)(3), (23)(4)};
C3M′ = {(1)(2)(3), (2)(3)(4)};
C4M′ = ∅
Note that it is impossible for agents 1 and 4 to be part of the same cycle product
since they both have a as their most preferred object. Any cycle product in RE that
is not in RP must have at least two agents; let x1 and x2 be, respectively, the lowest-
numbered agent and the second lowest-numbered agent in such a cycle. It is easy to verify
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that the associated transformation T (with this choice of x1 and x2) satisfies the claimed
properties. For the cycle c = (23) ∈ CM′ \ CM, note that T (c) = (2)(3) ∈ CM′ \ CM, and
that PM′(c) = 1/12 = PM′(T (c)). If c
′ = (243), T (c′) = (24)(3); and PM′(c′) = 1/24
as is PM′(T (c
′)). Finally, if c˜ = (2)(3)(4), T (c˜) = (23)(4); again, PM′(c˜) = 1/24 as is
PM′(T (c˜)). We leave it to the reader to verify the bijection for each of the other cycle
products.
We can summarize the discussion so far as follows: To prove that mechanisms M and
M′ satisfying properties (i)-(iv) are equivalent, it is sufficient to verify the equivalence of
M and M′ when there is a single agent and to prove Eq. (2.3). The latter can be done
by showing how to choose x1 and x2 such that the associated transformation T satisfies
properties (a) and (b). In the sections that follow, we shall carry out these (two) steps
for various pairs of mechanisms.
2.4 Linear Priority Structures
2.4.1 RP and RE in a model with endowments
We consider an assignment model in which some of the agents are endowed with objects.
The most prominent application is in the setting of house allocation where some of the
houses already have existing tenants who are willing to move but only to other houses
that are better for them. The RP and RE mechanisms can be generalized in many ways
to this setting, and several recent papers show the equivalence between the generalized
RP and RE mechanisms, see So¨mnez and U¨nver [79], Pathak and Sethuraman [66] and
Ekici [28]. To illustrate our general approach, we provide a simple proof of Ekici’s result,
which is also the most recent.
Suppose the agents A are partitioned into N and E, and the objects are partitioned
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into V and O, such that |E| = |O| and |N | = |V |. The interpretation is that every
agent in E is an “existing tenant,” and every object in O is an “occupied house.” The
agents in N are “new tenants”, and the “houses” in V are “vacant”. Each agent in E is
endowed with an object in O, for which he has the highest priority. Ekici [28] examines
the generalization of RP introduced by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez [3] and proposes
a natural generalization of the RE mechanism to this setting (we abuse notation and
continue to call these RP and RE), which we describe next. (Recall that the matching is
found by applying the TTC mechanism to a priority structure for the objects; the RP and
RE mechanisms differ only in how the priority structure—to which the TTC algorithm is
applied—is generated.)
RP. Let (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) be a permutation of the agents chosen uniformly at random,
that is, every permutation of the agents is equally likely. Let i∗ be the smallest i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n} for which agent σi is still in the problem. The priority structure for the
remaining objects is determined as follows: each object in V has σi∗ as the top-priority
agent; if the agent endowed with o ∈ O still remains in the problem, he retains top priority
for o, otherwise σi∗ has top priority for o.
RE. Let (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) be a permutation of the agents chosen uniformly at random,
that is, every permutation of the agents is equally likely. Suppose the objects are ordered
in an arbitrary (but fixed) manner so that there is a first object, a second object, and
so on. For each j = 1, 2, . . . , n, if the j-th object is in V , then its initial top-priority
agent is σj; otherwise, the j-th object is in O and is endowed to some agent i ∈ E. In
the latter case (j ∈ O), agent σj becomes the “inheritor” of that agent i: when agent i
departs, his priority for unassigned objects is passed on to σj, i.e. if i had top priority
for an unassigned object just before he left, σj will now have top priority for it. Note
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that the inheritor of an agent i ∈ E may be another agent i′ ∈ E who has already been
assigned an object, triggering a chain of inheritances until an inheritor yet to be assigned
an object is found. It is a simple matter to verify that each remaining object will have a
top priority agent at any stage.
We now give an alternative proof that RP and RE are equivalent in this setting. First
observe that both mechanisms satisfy properties (i)-(iv), with RP playing the role of M
and RE the role of M′ in the definitions of those properties. Additionally, when there
is a single agent it is clear that these mechanisms are equivalent. Finally, under both
RP and RE, after clearing a common cycle product c but with no further assumptions
on realizations of randomness, the residual problem is simply a smaller instance of the
original problem where we may treat an object s ∈ O as an object from V if the agent in
E endowed with s has already been matched. Consequently, we may use the induction
argument from §2.3.
To complete the proof of equivalence, we need to specify the transformation T , which
is the same as describing how to pick x1 and x2 given any cycle that is present in the
TTC graph of RE, but not in that of RP. We call an agent V -preferential if his most
preferred object is from V . Notice that each cycle product in the TTC graph for RP
involves at most one V -preferential agent; the TTC graph for RE contains all of these
cycle products but could contain other cycle products involving two or more V -preferential
agents. Consequently, any cycle product c ∈ ⋃l≥1 ClM′ \ ClM contains at least two V -
preferential agents. Given any cycle product c that could be present in the TTC graph
of RE, but not in that of RP, let x1 be the smallest-indexed V -preferential agent in c
and let x2 be the second-smallest. This choice of x1 and x2 satisfies property (a). It is
simple to verify that the cycle products c and T (c) occur with the same probability in
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RE, satisfying property (b).
2.4.2 Assignment models with agent groups
We turn now to a model, introduced by Carroll [16], in which we are given an exogenous
partition of the agents into groups. Furthermore, for each object, we are given a (fixed)
priority ordering of the groups. This is useful in modeling situations in which agents
within a group should be treated equally, but agents across groups can be prioritized.
Carroll showed that this model, described in more detail next, is rich enough to subsume
most of the equivalence results in the literature, the only notable exception being the
result of Ekici discussed in the previous section. In this model, Carroll proposed two
mechanisms—the Random Serial Dictatorship in Groups mechanism (RSDIG) and the
Within-Groups Top Trading Cycles mechanism (WGTTC)—and showed that they are
equivalent.
As before, we are given a set A of agents, a set S of objects, with |A| = |S|. Agents
have strict preferences over the objects. Suppose the agents are partitioned into groups
G1, G2, . . . Gm, for some m ≥ 1. Each group Gi has an associated role group with the same
number of members, Ri = {ri1, ri2, . . . , ri|Gi|}. Each object’s priority structure is given by an
ordering of the roles, such that all the roles belonging to a given group occur consecutively
(a property Carroll [16] calls group-respect); however the roles of a given group can be
ordered differently in the priority orderings of different objects. One interpretation of
these two features is as follows: each object is first endowed to some group and passes to
a different group only when all the members of the original group have all been matched;
however, a given group may choose to distribute the object it owns among its roles any
way it pleases. (This latter feature allows constraints such as objects a and b cannot have
the same top-priority agent.) The priority structure for the objects is specified in terms
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of roles, so following Carroll [16] we call this a priority framework. The two mechanisms
studied by Carroll differ only in the priority frameworks to which the TTC algorithm is
applied:




2, . . . , r
i
|Gi|.
WGTTC. For each group Gi, there is no restriction on the ordering of roles, and the
ordering may differ from object to object.
In each of these cases the roles have to be instantiated before applying the TTC
algorithm. This is done by choosing, for each group Gi, a bijection uniformly at random
from its set of roles Ri to the set of agents Gi. In such a case, Carroll showed that the
RSDIG and WGTTC mechanisms are equivalent. We give an alternative proof of this
result.
Observe that both mechanisms satisfy properties (i)-(iv), with RSDIG as M and
WGTTC as M′. Furthermore, it is clear the two mechanisms are equivalent when there
is a single agent. Finally, in both RSDIG and WGTTC, after clearing a common cycle
product c, the residual problem is a smaller instance of the original problem restricted
to the remaining agents and objects. So we may use the induction argument of §2.3. It
remains to show there is an appropriate way to pick x1 and x2 for transformation T so
that PM′(c) = PM′(T (c)).
Observe that each cycle product in the TTC graph for RSDIG involves at most one
agent from each group. The TTC graph for WGTTC contains all of these cycle products,
but also includes those containing two or more agents from some group. Let c be a cycle
product containing two or more agents from some group. Consider the smallest labeled
group with two or more agents in c. Let x1 be the smallest and x2 the second-smallest
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labeled agents from that group in c, and consider the canonical transformation T described
earlier. The resulting cycle product T (c) corresponds to the cycle product induced by the
same role-to-agent map as c except that the roles of x1 and x2 are swapped. Since x1 and
x2 are in the same group, it follows that the role-to-agent maps inducing c and T (c) both
occur with the same probability. This verifies properties (a)-(b) so the equivalence result
follows.
2.5 Tree-based inheritance with groups and endow-
ments
We are ready to formulate a general object assignment model. As before we have a set
A of agents and a set S of objects. Each agent wishes to be assigned exactly one object.
Suppose the agents are partitioned into A and E and the objects are partitioned into
V and O. Each object o ∈ O is endowed to an agent ρ(o) ∈ E, and each agent i ∈ E
is endowed with at least one object in O. (Different objects in O may be endowed to
the same agent.) Thus |O| ≥ |E| and ρ(O) = E. As in our earlier discussion, one can
think of the agents in E as the existing tenants and the objects in O as the houses they
occupy in a house allocation model; in that case, the agents in N and the houses in V are,
respectively, the new tenants and the new houses. Agents have strict preferences over the
objects. The priority structure of the objects—a distinguishing feature of our model—is
specified by an inheritance tree, which generalizes the models of Carroll [16], as well as
the earlier models of Papai [64] and Svensson & Larsson [81]. In particular, the priority
structure allows for objects to be endowed to certain agents, admits group hierarchies,
and additionally allows the inheritance of an object to depend on the partial matching at
that stage.
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The agents are also partitioned into groups G1, G2, . . . , Gm so that Gi ∩Gj = ∅ for all
i 6= j and ⋃Gi = A. Note that composition of each of these groups is unrestricted: Gi
may have a non-empty intersection with A or E or both. However the group membership
of an agent may affect his priority for certain objects. Each agent group Gi is associated
with a set of roles Ri with |Ri| = |Gi|, with Ri ∩ Rj = ∅ for all j 6= i. The priority
structure for each object is specified in terms of roles. When the mechanism is run, the
roles, Ri, are instantiated with the agents in Gi, uniformly at random: each mapping of
the roles Ri to the agents in Gi is equally likely. We say that an agent a or role r owns
an object o if a or r has the topmost priority for o.
2.5.1 Inheritance Trees
The priority structure of each object is specified in terms of an inheritance tree as intro-
duced by Papai [64], with one key difference: the nodes of the tree are populated by roles
rather than the agents.
Every object o ∈ S has an associated inheritance tree Γo, which is a rooted tree graph
with directed arcs. If there are n agents in all, Γo has one root node (level 0), n− 1 nodes
at level 1, (n− 1)(n− 2) nodes at level 2, etc., each of which is labeled with a role. Each
node has exactly one incoming arc except the root (which has none), and each node at
level k has (n−k−1) outgoing arcs, each of which terminates at a node at level k+1 and
is labeled with an object other than o and the k objects appearing as labels in the unique
path from the root to that node. Moreover, in any path from the root to a leaf, each role
label should appear exactly once. The agent who owns the object is the one whose role
is the label of the root.
The tree Γo defines an inheritance plan for the object o in the following sense: consider
the path from the root node v0 to a node vk, and suppose the labels of the nodes and
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arcs in the path are r0 − o0 − r1 − o1 − r2 − . . .− rk−1 − ok−1 − rk. Then the agent with
role rk owns o if for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1 the agent with role ri is assigned object oi, and
the agent with role rk is still unassigned. (The assignment of agents with roles other
than ri, i = 0, . . . , k to objects other than o, o0, o1, . . . , ok−1 is immaterial.) Note that
the definition of an inheritance tree ensures that in any partial assignment of objects to
agents, either object o is assigned, or there is a unique maximal path originating from the
root of Γo using only agents and objects in that partial assignment whose terminal node
is the role of an unmatched agent, who next owns o.
We are now ready to specify the priority structure for each object o ∈ S. For o ∈ V ,
the priority structure is given by the inheritance tree Γo, with the roles instantiated
uniformly at random from the corresponding groups; each object o ∈ O is owned by the
agent ρ(o) until that agent is assigned an object; if ρ(o) is assigned an object, but o is
still unassigned, its ownership will be governed by its inheritance tree Γo.
Suppose the TTC mechanism is applied to a problem where the priority structure for
each object is given by an inheritance tree. We describe how the trees are updated when
a cycle c is cleared. Typically this process involves trimming branches and contracting
arcs so that information that is no longer useful is discarded; the resulting updated tree
will involve only those objects and roles that are still “unassigned”. Let X be the set of
objects that are assigned and let Y be the roles that these objects are assigned to when
the TTC mechanism is applied. For each x ∈ X, let λ(x) be the role in Y that x is
assigned to. The inheritance trees are updated as follows:
• Discard the inheritance trees Γo for each o ∈ X;
• For each x ∈ X, and for each node labeled λ(x) in every remaining inheritance tree,
delete every outgoing arc from that node with a label other than x (and the subtree
rooted at the other end of that arc). So for each x ∈ X, the only arc that emanates
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from any node labeled λ(x) will be labeled x.
• Contract every arc with a label of x emanating from a node labeled λ(x) (this is
the same as deleting the arc x, and moving the subtree rooted at its head node to
its tail node).
Observe that the updates to the inheritance trees removes all the paths that can no longer
be realized and retains the paths that may still be realized. We end this section with an
illustrative example.
Example 2.5.1. Consider an instance of the problem with 4 agents {1, 2, 3, 4} and 4
houses {a, b, c, d}, and suppose role ri is mapped to agent i for each i. Focus on object a,
whose inheritance tree is given by Γa in Figure 2.1(a). We illustrate in Figures 2.1(b)–(d)
how ownership and the inheritance tree of object a evolves under some sequence of (sub-
)matchings, say (1 ← b), (3 ← d), (2 ← c), and (4 ← a) in the given order. Initially, a
is owned by agent 1, who is assigned b in phase 1. Following this, a’s inheritance tree is
updated to Γ′a, and agent 2 becomes the new owner of a. When agent 3 is assigned d, 2
continues to own a, but a’s inheritance tree is updated to Γ′′a. Then, agent 2 is assigned c
at which point agent 4 becomes the owner of a; this is shown in the tree Γ′′′a . Finally 4 is
matched with a so a is removed from the problem.
2.5.2 Equivalence results
We generalize the equivalence results discussed earlier to settings in which the priority
structure for each object is an inheritance tree. To state the equivalence result formally,
we need the following definitions.
Given an inheritance tree Γ, define G(Γ) to be the tree obtained by replacing each role
at the nodes of Γ with the group to which that role belongs. Inheritance trees Γ and Γ′
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Figure 2.1: The evolution of Γa in Example 2.5.1.
are G-similar if G(Γ) and G(Γ′) are identical.
An inheritance tree is a random priority inheritance tree if in every root-to-leaf path,
the roles belonging to each group Gi appear in ascending order (from the lowest index to
the highest index). Notice that when all the inheritance trees in the problem are random
priority inheritance trees, each o ∈ V owned by a member of a group Gi will be owned by
the same role. Given an arbitrary inheritance tree Γ, there is a natural relabeling of the
nodes that gives rise to the associated random priority inheritance tree RP (Γ): find G(Γ)
and apply the random-priority labeling to it. It follows that if Γ and Γ′ are G-similar,
RP (Γ) = RP (Γ′).
For a partial assignment (or matching) pi, and an object s ∈ O, let gpi(s) be the group
to which s is assigned; if s is not assigned to any agent in pi, define gpi(s) to be zero. Two
partial assignments pi and pi′ are G-equivalent if gpi(s) = gpi′(s) for all s ∈ O. In other
words, pi and pi′ must assign the same objects, and each object assigned by them must be
assigned to the same group under both pi and pi′ (although the actual agents or roles to
which s is assigned may differ). Given an inheritance tree Γ and a partial assignment pi,
let Γpi be the updated inheritance tree after the objects and roles in pi are removed from
the problem. An inheritance tree Γ is G-invariant if G(Γpi) = G(Γpi
′
) for any G-equivalent
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partial assignments pi and pi′. Note that if Γ is G-invariant, then so is any inheritance
tree Γ′ that is G-similar to Γ.
Γa
b c d
c d b d b c
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(c) Induced random priority
inheritance tree
Figure 2.2: Inheritance trees Γa, G(Γa), and RP (Γa) for Example 2.5.2.
Example 2.5.2. Consider the inheritance tree Γa in Figure 2.2(a). Let the groups be
G1 = {1}, G2 = {2}, G3 = {3, 4}. After relabeling the roles with their associated groups,
we get G(Γa) as shown in Figure 2.2(b). The random-priority tree induced by Γa, RP (Γa),
is shown in Figure 2.2(c): in every path from the root to any leaf the roles of each group
appear consecutively, and in ascending order. Moreover, both Γa and RP (Γa) are G-
invariant.
Theorem 2.5.1. Fix A = (E,N), S = (O, V ) and ρ. Let {Γs} be a set of inheritance
trees on (A, S) that are G-invariant. Then the TTC mechanism using {Γs} and the TTC
mechanism using {RP (Γs)} are equivalent.
Proof. Let M be the TTC mechanism applied to {RP (Γs)} and let M′ be the TTC mech-
anism applied to {Γs}. With this interpretation, property (i) is immediate; property (ii)
follows from the G-invariance of {Γs} for M′, and from the G-invariance of {RP (Γs)} for
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M. (Note that G-invariance of {RP (Γs)} is implied by G-invariance of {Γs}.) Proper-
ties (iii) and (iv) are also easily verified for the two mechanisms. Furthermore, it is clear
that the two mechanisms are equivalent when there is a single agent.
Consider the TTC graph for M and M′ in the residual problem under any sequence
of cleared cycles, with no further assumptions on the realizations of randomness. Since
the sequence of cycles cleared are the same, the inheritance trees are updated in both
mechanisms similarly (the same arcs are deleted and contracted, though the role labels
removed may differ). Moreover, the remaining agents and objects are the same in both
mechanisms. It follows that the updated inheritance trees under M are the same as the
random-priority trees induced by the updated inheritance trees under M′ (a relabeling of
roles may be necessary), so we can use the induction argument from §2.3.
It remains to show that there is an appropriate way to pick x1 and x2 for transformation
T that satisfy properties (a)-(b). Consider the agents whose most preferred object is from
V , whom we call V -preferential agents. Observe that each cycle product in the TTC
graph for M has at most one V -preferential agent from Gk for each k. The TTC graph
for M′ contains these cycle products as well (in addition to zero or more cycle products
containing at least two V -preferential agents from the same group). Consider the lowest
labeled group with at least two V -preferential agents in c. Let x1 and x2 be, respectively,
the lowest and second-lowest labeled V -preferential agents from this group. This satisfies
property (a). Additionally, the resulting cycle product T (c) is exactly the cycle product
induced by the same role-to-agent map as c except that the roles mapping to x1 and x2
are swapped. Since x1 and x2 are in the same group, the role-to-agent maps inducing c
and T (c) both occur with the same probability, so property (b) is satisfied as well, and
the equivalence result follows.
Corollary 2.5.1. Fix A = (E,N), S = (O, V ) and ρ. Let {Γs} and {Γ′s} be two sets of
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inheritance trees on (A, S) that are G-invariant, and let Γs be G-similar to Γ
′
s for each
s ∈ S. Then the TTC mechanism using {Γs} and the TTC mechanism using {Γ′s} are
equivalent.
Proof. As {Γs} and {Γ′s} are G-similar, {RP (Γs)} and {RP (Γ′s)} are identical, and the
result is immediate from Theorem 2.5.1
Remark. One can think of G-invariance as a natural generalization of the notion of
a group respecting priority structure as defined by Carroll [16] (see §2.4.2). While this
restriction is a technical necessity in the equivalence proof, it is not an unreasonable one:
For example, in allocating public housing with agents grouped by income level, it may
be undesirable for a house to pass from a low income group to a high income group and
back to the low income group. This cannot occur if the inheritance structure is group
respecting. Following Carroll, we could define an inheritance tree to be group respecting
if in any path from the root to a leaf, all roles from the same group appear consecutively.
It is easy to verify that every G-invariant tree is group respecting, but the converse is not
true. Example 2.5.3 demonstrates the necessity of G-invariance for the equivalence result
to hold. It also shows that equivalence may not hold when trees are group respecting
but not G-invariant. If the inheritance tree is equivalent to a linear priority order as in
Carroll [16], it can be shown that an inheritance tree is G-invariant if and only if it is
group-respecting.
Example 2.5.3. To demonstrate the necessity of G-invariance of all trees, consider the
following 4-agent example. Let A = {1, 2, 3, 4}, S = {a, b, c, d}, with three groups G1 =
{1, 2} (with corresponding roles {r1, r2}), G2 = {3} (with roles {r3}) and G3 (with roles
{r4}). Suppose the agents’ preferences are given by Table 2.2, and that the inheritances for
the objects are defined by the following trees: for a, Γa as given in 2.3(a); for b, Γb induced
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by the linear ordering of roles r1  r2  r3  r4; for c, Γc induced by the linear ordering
r2  r1  r3  r4; and for d, Γd induced by the linear ordering r1  r2  r3  r4. Notice
that Γb, Γc and Γd are G-invariant. On the other hand, although Γa is group-respecting it
is not G-invariant since the two matchings (1← b, 2← c) (induced by the role mappings
r1 → 1, r2 → 2) and (1 ← c, 2 ← b) (induced by r1 → 2, r2 → 1) are G-equivalent but
result in top-priority roles from different groups for a (G2 and G3 respectively).
1 2 3 4
c c a a
b b d d
a a c c
d d b b
Table 2.2: Agent preferences for Example 2.5.3.
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b c d
c d b d b c
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(b) G-invariant
Figure 2.3: Two inheritance trees for object a in Example 2.5.3.
It is simple to verify the following: under {Γs} two matchings (1 ← b, 2 ← c, 3 ←
a, 4 ← d) and (1 ← c, 2 ← b, 3 ← a, 4 ← d) are output with equal probability; under
{RP (Γs)} two matchings (1← b, 2← c, 3← d, 4← a) and (1← c, 2← b, 3← d, 4← a)
are output with equal probability. Notice that under {Γs} 3 is always assigned a and 4 is
always assigned d, whereas under {RP (Γs)} the reverse holds. So the two mechanisms
are not equivalent.
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Now, consider if a has inheritance tree Γ∗a given in Figure 2.3(b) instead, while the
inheritance trees of the other objects Γ∗s are the same as Γs. It is not difficult to check that
the mechanisms induced by {Γ∗s} and {RP (Γ∗s)} are equivalent, in particular both output
two possible matchings (1 ← b, 2 ← c, 3 ← a, 4 ← d) and (1 ← c, 2 ← b, 3 ← a, 4 ← d)
with equal probability.
Remark. It is not difficult to see that inheritance trees allows for inheritance structure
that cannot be captured by any linear ordering of roles. For example, consider a 4-agent
instance where the agents {1, 2, 3, 4} are in three groups G1 = {1, 2} (roles {r1, r2}),
G2 = {3} (roles {r3}) and G3 = {4} (roles {r4}), and the objects are {a, b, c, d}. Suppose
the inheritance tree a is given by Γa in Figure 2.4. If 1 is assigned b and 2 is assigned
c, 3 becomes the owner of a. However, if instead 1 is assigned b and 2 is assigned d, 4
becomes the owner of a. It is not difficult to see that no group-respecting linear orderings
can capture this sort of branching behavior.
Γa
b c d
c d b d b c





r3 r3 r4 r3
r4 r4 r3 r4
Figure 2.4: A G-invariant tree that cannot be represented by any linear inheritance.
2.6 Discussion
Our approach suggests the following general framework for thinking about allocating
indivisible objects to a group of agents. Suppose we are given a set of agents with strict
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preferences over objects, and an exogenous partition of the agents into groups; suppose
also that agents are partitioned into “existing tenants” and “new agents,” and objects
into “occupied” and “vacant” objects. Each occupied object has an obvious top-priority
agent, namely, the agent who occupies it. Assume each vacant object is endowed to a
unique group. Finally, each group can assign the top-priority role any way it pleases for
all of the vacant objects endowed to it. Each group instantiates its roles uniformly at
random, either without repetition (a given role is equally likely to be mapped to any
remaining agent in that group who is not yet mapped) or with repetition (each role is
equally likely to be mapped to any remaining agent in that group). Each group makes
this decision independently, and can choose either type of mapping, regardless of what
the other groups do. The TTC algorithm is used to clear (a subset of) cycles. If a vacant
object remains, but its occupant does not, it is treated as a new object. If an object is
endowed to a group, and its top-priority agent is no longer present, it is endowed to a
different agent in the same group, assuming at least one such agent exists. If an object
is endowed to a group, its top-priority agent is no longer present and no agent from that
group is present, control of that object passes to another group (in a G-invariant way).
Our general approach shows that the final outcome is the same regardless of how the
groups assign the objects they control amongst themselves. It is easy to see that all the
mechanisms considered in this chapter fit into this framework.
Consider the special case in which none of the agents are endowed with an object.
Note that in this case all the mechanisms in this framework are strategyproof (SP),
and always yield a Pareto efficient (PE) assignment. Furthermore, agents with identical
preferences receive identical (probabilistic) allocations (ETE). The aforementioned result
boils down to the statement that every mechanism in this framework is equivalent to the
RP mechanism. An intriguing conjecture that suggests itself, in light of these equivalence
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results, is that the RP mechanism is characterized by these three properties. If we only
require a subset of these properties, there are other mechanisms: giving an equal share
of each object to each agent satisfies SP and ETE, but not PE; a serial dictatorship with
an exogenous order of the agents satisfies SP and PE, but not ETE; and the probabilistic
serial mechanism of Bogomolnaia and Moulin [14] satisfies PE and ETE, but not SP. The
characterization result is, of course, of independent interest. We note, however, that such




Newsvendor with expert advice
In this chapter, we focus on the newsvendor problem under the presence of experts that
provide stocking decisions advice to the inventory manager, with a minimax objective on
the regret of the manager versus the best expert. In particular, we describe an optimal
algorithm, and establish conditions under which the algorithm may be efficiently evaluated
and how, as well as provide a novel asymptotic analysis that leads to the development of
a heuristic for the optimal algorithm.
3.1 Introduction
The repeated newsvendor problem for systems facing unknown demand is an important
classical problem in inventory management. Assuming that demand is i.i.d. across each
period, demand can be learnt and used non-parametrically, i.e. without a priori assump-
tions on its form (see e.g. [33], [52]), or parametrically with demand that is uncensored
(see e.g. [6], [45], [48], [56], [62], [75, 77]) or censored (see e.g. [22], [19], [24], [51], [59, 58]
[41]). When the i.i.d. assumption on demand across the time horizon is relaxed, and
dependencies and non-stationarity permitted, it is still possible to learn and use demand
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if the sequence of demands is predictable using time-series or other forecasting methods
(see e.g. [76], [84], [46], [57], [35, 34], [39]).
However, when the demand is both non-i.i.d. and not amenable to standard forecast-
ing techniques, the objective of minimizing the cumulative cost while learning demand
becomes difficult to realize, especially in the case where demand is stock-dependent. In
such scenarios, the minimax approach has found some measure of success (see e.g. [74],
[60, 61], [32], [9], [10], [67]). In the minimax approach, it is assumed that some aspect of
demand is fixed, e.g. the range of the demand or the mean and variance of the demand.
The objective is to minimize the maximum cost across all possible demand realizations
that satisfy the demand assumptions. This approach is a framework that is able to handle
demand with complex dependencies or when the nature of dependencies is unknown, al-
though it should be noted that it aims at optimizing worst-case performance and neglects
average-case performance which can lead to overly conservative decisions.
We look at the following variation of the minimax approach. Consider the scenario
where the inventory manager knows only that demand is bounded, but has recourse to
advice on stocking level decisions provided by experts or oracles outside his control. In
the real-world context, the stocking advice may be stocking levels generated by using
different forecasting techniques, or provided by different pieces of software, to name a few
examples. It is also not clear a priori which among the advice rendered would be the best
in each period. We cannot expect the inventory manager to achieve minimal cost when
all the experts provide poor advice, so the objective of the inventory manager is instead
to minimize worst-case performance compared to the expert whose advice performs the
best, i.e. to minimize his regret of not following the best expert. We concern ourselves
mainly with the case where there are two experts that provide advice, but later extend
our analysis to the case of multiple experts.
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It turns out the scenario we are concerned is a variant within the class of problems of
predicting sequences with expert advice. These problems of prediction are generally set up
as follows: there is a series of trials, one in each period and with binary outcomes; in each
period, the decision-maker has to predict that period’s trial outcome and is made to pay a
cost depending on how far off his prediction is from the outcome; however, before making
his decision, the decision-maker has recourse to predictions made by experts outside his
control, which he may utilize in making his prediction; the goal of the decision-maker is
to make decisions to minimize the regret of not following the best expert. The decision-
maker’s prediction in each period is in the form of the probability that period’s trial is
successful. Furthermore, since the focus is on worst-case performance, the experts and
trial outcomes may be assumed to be controlled by an adversary acting in opposition to
the decision-maker. The first results for this set of models were due to Blackwell [13]
and Hannan [37] and the model was subsequently re-discovered and widely studied by the
machine learning and statistics community in recent years. Early works in the literature
include the Weighted Majority algorithm of Littlestone and Warmuth [53] and the Aggre-
gating algorithm of Vovk [86], where the decision-maker’s prediction is a weighted sum of
the predictions of the experts and the weights used are updated from period to period.
Variants of the Weighted Majority algorithm were also studied in later years (see [30],
[5], [88], among others). Alternative algorithms were also developed based on following
the best-performing expert at any point in time, for example the Follow-the-Pertubed-
Leader algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [47]. For extended discussion of these algorithms,
interested readers may refer to Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [18].
This framework can be extended in a natural way to accommodate the newsvendor
context by allowing the (demand) outcomes to be anywhere within some continuous in-
terval (since demand may take values within some range) and allowing for an asymmetric
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linear cost function (since per-unit overage and underage costs and hence the costs of
over- and under-prediction can differ). We call the resulting model the newsvendor prob-
lem with expert advice. Cesa-Bianchi et al. [17] give an algorithm MM that is optimal
for the problem of predicting sequences with expert advice in the case where the cost of
mis-prediction is linear. We show MM can be easily extended to give an optimal algo-
rithm for the newsvendor problem with expert advice. The major issue with using either
of these algorithms is that computing their decisions requires evaluating a function v that
is described by recursively defined optimization problems. In fact, one question posed by
Cesa-Bianchi et al. is whether v may be computed efficiently. Answering this question
forms the core of this chapter, and we discover that the answer is in the affirmative. We
find that when b and h are relatively integral, i.e. when they are both small multiples
of some common factor or one is a multiple of the other, computing a value of v is com-
putationally inexpensive. To handle cases where b and h are not relatively integral, we
directly analyze the asymptotic behavior of v using a novel approach that models the
function using martingales, in order to motivate a heuristic for calculating v. This is in
contrast to existing approaches that draw conclusions about the limiting behavior of v
from analyzing policies that are suboptimal but whose performance scales well with the
number of periods. Our direct analysis of v uncovers its transient structure when scaling
one of its parameters. This transient structure turns out to be very useful in formulating
an approximation scheme for v. We use this to find an approximation for OPT that we
call APX, whose decisions we show via a numerical experiment to be almost identical to
OPT, and for which we give an example how it could extended to more than two experts.
To the best of our knowledge, OPT is the only optimal algorithm (and APX the
only approximation to an optimal algorithm) for the newsvendor problem with expert
advice. However, we note that there are several other algorithms, outside the scope of
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this chapter, that can be used for this problem either directly or with little modification.
For example, Haussler, Kivinen and Warmuth [38] describes an algorithm that can handle
general loss functions and continuous outcomes, and several of the other algorithms in
Cesa-Bianchi et al. [17] can be modified to handle the newsvendor context, just as we had
done with MM to get OPT. In contrast to OPT, these other algorithms typically have no
assurances on working well when the number of periods is small, but are easy to compute
in general and their performance can be shown to scale in the size of the problem (the
number of periods) almost as well as an optimal algorithm when the size gets sufficiently
large. We also note that while OPT and APX are tailored to the two expert case, these
other algorithms are designed to use the advice of more than two experts.
Finally, there have also been attempts other than ours to utilize algorithms for predic-
tion with expert advice models within the newsvendor context. O’Neil and Chaudhary
[63] adapt the Weighted Majority algorithm of Littlestone and Warmuth [54] and the
Follow the Perturbed Leader algorithm of Kalai and Vempala [47] for the newsvendor
problem with expert advice. However, rather than allow the adversary to control the ex-
perts, they divide up the space of possible demands into buckets, assign each bucket to a
different expert and have each expert recommend the minimax quantity within its bucket.
Consequently, their analyses and their results pertain more to the newsvendor problem
with a minimax objective rather than the newsvendor problem with expert advice.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: §3.2 describes the newsvendor problem
with expert advice, for which we describe an optimal algorithm OPT in §3.3; §3.4 is the
focus of this chapter, and in it we examine conditions under which computation of v is
in polynomial time (§3.4.3) and analyze the asymptotic behavior of v directly (§3.4.4);
finally, §3.5 describes an approximation scheme for v and the resulting the approximation
algorithm APX (§3.5.1), compares its decisions with those of OPT via a numerical example
CHAPTER 3. NEWSVENDOR WITH EXPERT ADVICE 45
(§3.5.2) and gives a simple way to extend APX to use advice from more than two experts
(§3.5.3).
3.2 Model description
In this section, we discuss a model for the newsvendor problem with expert advice. Models
of the sort we will describe have been used extensively in problems of prediction. The
particular one we use is a variant of the one discussed and analyzed in Cesa-Bianchi et
al. [17], which looked at predicting binary sequences with recourse to expert advice. The
main difference between the two variants is that the cost function they are concerned
with is symmetric with respect to under- and over-prediction while the cost function we
are concerned with can be asymmetric with respect to under- and over-prediction. We
note that some recent papers have also considered similar models within the newsvendor
context ([63]).
There is a finite planning horizon consisting of T periods, where time is indexed by t
in a backward manner from T to 1; thus, T is the first period in the horizon and 1 is the
last period. Denote the sequence of realized demands by d = (dT , dT−1, . . . , d1), where dt
represents the realized demand in period t. Assume that the range for possible values of
demand is bounded and known; without loss of generality, the magnitude of demand is
normalized to dt ∈ [0, 1].
In each period t, an inventory manager has to decide a stocking level decision yt ∈ [0, 1].
He has recourse to two experts, i = 1, 2, each of whom provides him a reference stocking
level decision ξit before he makes his decision. In addition, the inventory manager may
base his decision on all other available historical data: the realized demand in previous
periods, and the past decisions of both of the experts and himself. After the inventory
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manager makes his decision, demand dt is realized and costs (both overage and underage)
are incurred based on the stocking decision and the realized demand. The overage and
underage costs are assumed to be linear with per-unit costs of h ≥ 0 and b ≥ 0 respectively,
so the cost incurred by the inventory manager this period is
h(yt − dt)+ + b(dt − yt)+ . (3.1)
Let λt be the cumulative cost incurred by the manager from periods T to t+1, and M
i
t
be the cumulative cost through the same periods if the inventory manager had utilized
decisions of expert i instead (i.e. if the inventory manager had decided yt = ξ
i
t for each
t = T, . . . , t+ 1). These quantities are recursively described by
λt−1 = λt + h(yt − dt)+ + b(dt − yt)+ , and (3.2)




t − dt)+ + b(dt − ξit)+ for i = 1, 2. (3.3)










The goal of the inventory manager is to minimize his regret of not having followed the
advice of the better of the two experts, i.e. he seeks to minimize
λ0 −min{M10 ,M20} .
We will refer to the above expression as the manager’s regret.
Remark. A greedy policy, where in each period t the inventory manager chooses yt = ξ
i∗
t
with i∗ = argmin{M it}, can perform badly. Hutter and Poland [42] give the following
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example applicable to the case of b = h:
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and dt = 0 for all t; the regret using the greedy policy can be shown to be linear in the
number of periods. Moreover, the same example can be extended to the case of b 6= h by
weighting all the adversary’s decisions by b/(b+ h).
A worst-case approach is taken, and it is assumed that there is an adversary who
controls the decisions of the both experts as well as the realized demand in each period
and acts against the interest of the inventory manager.
Remark. The problem can viewed as a finitely-repeated sequential two-player game based
on the newsvendor problem, where the first player is the inventory manager who decides
the stocking level yt, and the other player is an adversary who decides both the experts’
choice of stocking levels (ξ1t , ξ
2
t ) as well the realized demand dt.
3.3 An optimal algorithm
In this section, we discuss a straightforward extension of the MM algorithm of Cesa-
Bianchi et al. [17] to handle the newsvendor problem with expert advice. We first show
that the newsvendor problem can be reduced to a problem of predicting binary sequences
with an asymmetric cost function by examining the adversary’s problem in §3.3.1. This
implies that the MM algorithm, which is applicable and optimal for the newsvendor
context when b = h, can be modified such that it is also optimal for the newsvendor
context for general b and h. Describing this modified algorithm, which we call OPT, first
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requires us to define an auxiliary problem, which we do so in §3.4.1. OPT itself is outlined
in 3.3.2.
3.3.1 The adversary’s problem
Let Ft be the history up to the end of period t. (More formally, Ft = {ξik, yk, dk : i =
1, 2, T ≥ k ≥ t}, with FT+1 = ∅.) Fix the algorithm used by manager, which we denote
by A. Let At(Ft+1, (ξ1t , ξ2t )) be the manager’s stocking decision in period t given the
system history up to the end of period t + 1 and both experts’ stocking decisions in
period t. The adversary’s problem can be written as the following dynamic program. For
t ∈ {T, T − 1, . . . , 1},







λt−1,Mt−1 | Ft+1 ∪ {dt, yt, (ξ1t , ξ2t )}
)
s. t. Eq. (3.2), Eq. (3.3), yt = At(Ft+1, (ξ1t , ξ2t )), and ξ1t , ξ2t , dt ∈ [0, 1] ,
(3.4)
and (for t = 0) JA0 (λ0,M0 | F1) = λ0−min{M10 ,M20}. Under A, the inventory manager’s
regret is JAT (0,0 | FT+1), or simply JAT (0,0). (Throughout this paper, we denote by 1 the
vector of all 1’s of an appropriate length, and by 0 the vector of all 0’s.)
In the above definition of JAt , the maximization is taken over all possible values of
dt in the interval [0, 1]. The following proposition ensures that it suffices to consider the
extreme values of dt only. Interested readers may refer to §3.7.1 for the proof.
Proposition 3.3.1. Fix the algorithm used by the manager, the set of optimal adversarial
choices for the realized demand dt in period t contains either 0 or 1 (or both).
Proposition 3.3.1 allows us to assume that the adversary always chooses either 0 or 1
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for the realized demand in every period. (This assumption may affect the incurred costs
of the manager and the experts in each period, but the difference in the cost between the
manager and that of each expert in every period is the same for any optimal adversarial
choice.) More specifically, we may replace the constraint dt ∈ [0, 1] in the definition
of JAt with dt ∈ {0, 1}. This reduces the newsvendor problem with expert advice to a
problem of predicting binary sequences with expert advice, but with a cost function that
is asymmetric and linear with under- and over-prediction costs of b and h respectively.
3.3.2 The algorithm OPT and its optimality
An optimal algorithm for the problem of predicting binary sequences with expert advice
under symmetric linear over- and under-prediction costs (i.e. the case where b = h) is
the MM algorithm described by Cesa-Bianchi et al. [17]. Since we have reduced the
newsvendor problem with expert advice to a prediction problem with an asymmetric
linear cost function (where it is possible and probable that b 6= h), we would think that
the MM algorithm could be modified to handle the more general cost function. Indeed,
this turns out to be the case and we describe the result, which we call the algorithm OPT,
in this section.
Before describing OPT, we define the following value function, which will be used to
compute decisions in OPT and also plays an important role in its analysis:
v(M, 0) = min
i∈{1,2}
{M i} ,
v(M, t) = min
Z∈[0,1]2
b · v(M + hZ, t− 1) + h · v(M + b(1− Z), t− 1)
b+ h
for t ≥ 1,
where M ∈ R2. With this value function in mind, OPT is described in Figure 3.1. (Note
that we can obtain MM from OPT by replacing both b and h by 1 in Eq. (3.5) and in
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the definition of v.)
Input: T ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} ; b, h ∈ R+
Output: Stocking level decisions yT , yT−1, . . . , y1.
1. t← T ; MTi ← 0 for i = 1, 2.
2. While t > 0, in the period t do:
3. Observe expert stocking decisions Z = (ξ1t , ξ
2
t ).





v(Mt + hZ, t− 1)− v(Mt + b(1− Z), t− 1)
b+ h
, (3.5)





5. After demand dt is realized, compute M
i
t−1, i = 1, 2, using Eq. (3.3).
6. t← t− 1.
Figure 3.1: An optimal algorithm OPT.
The following two results show OPT is optimal and is stated without proof. They can
be derived using arguments similar to those used in Cesa-Bianchi et al. [17] to prove the
optimality of the MM algorithm. (Note that Proposition 3.3.1 is necessary to be able to
make these arguments for OPT.)
Proposition 3.3.2. For any algorithm A used by the manager,
JAT (0,0) ≥ T ·
bh
b+ h
− v(0, T ) .
Theorem 3.3.3.
JOPTT (0,0) ≤ T ·
bh
b+ h
− v(0, T ) .
Observe that both the computation of and characterization of regret under OPT de-
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pend on v, effectively the objective value of a multi-stage optimization problem. We have
no assurances that v is easily computable or easily characterizable, even in the case when
b = h. Indeed, Cesa-Bianchi et al. [17] state that each evaluation of v(M, t) can be
computed via 23T recursive calls (when there are two experts and in the case of b = h)
and pose the question of whether v can be computed efficiently. We address this question
in the next section, the main focus of this chapter.
3.4 Computation and analysis of value function v
Since the decisions made by OPT involve the value function v, the computational efficiency
of implementing this algorithm depends on the ready access to the values of v, which is
recursively defined. We achieve two results regarding v in this section. The first is a
partial answer to what the conditions are under which v may be efficiently computed,
which is the subject of §3.4.3. The second is an analysis of the asymptotic behavior of v
using a new approach using random-walks in §3.4.4, which will later motivate a heuristic
for evaluating v and thus for OPT in §3.5.1. However, before proceeding, we state several
basic properties of v in §3.4.1 that we will use throughout this section and explore how
to reduce the decision space of the recursive optimization problem describing v in §3.4.2.
3.4.1 Properties of v
We will use the following properties of v, which can be proved in a straightforward manner
by induction on t and using the definition of v.
A. For any t ≥ 0, m ∈ R, and M ∈ R2, v(M +m1, t) = v(M, t) +m.
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X i − Y i} ≤ v(X, t)− v(Y, t) ≤ max
i∈{1,2}
{
X i − Y i} .
C. v(M, t) is concave in M, i.e., for all X,Y ∈ R2 and α ∈ (0, 1),
v(αX + (1− α)Y, t) ≥ αv(X, t) + (1− α)v(Y, t) .
D. For all M ∈ R2 and α ∈ (0, 1), v(αM, t) ≥ αv(M, t).
Readers interested in specifics may refer to Cesa-Bianchi [17] which show properties (b)
and (c) for the case of b = h = 1. (The approach for b 6= h is similar.)
3.4.2 Reducing the decision space in v
Recall the definition of v, i.e.
v(M, t) = min
Z∈[0,1]2
b · v(M + hZ, t− 1) + h · v(M + b(1− Z), t− 1)
b+ h
for t ≥ 1.
Each stage of recursion for v(M, t) requires minimizing a function over the unit square
[0, 1]2. However, since v(M, t) is concave in M (property C), the expression in it over
which minimization is performed is concave in Z ∈ [0, 1]2 so the value of minimizer is one
of the four corners of the unit square [0, 1]2: (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), or (1, 1). This implies that
v(·, t) may be evaluated via 4t recursive calls, each corresponding to a specific sequence
of minimizer choices for Z. Note that this had already been observed in Cesa-Bianchi et
al. [17] for the case where b = h.
To further reduce the search space, we introduce a function f that can be viewed as
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a transformation of the v function into single-dimensional space, at the cost of some loss
of information. In this form, we are able to tighten our search space to two values at
each stage, instead of four. Furthermore, function f will play an important role in the
asymptotic analysis of v in §3.4.4.
Definition 3.4.1. Let f : R× {0, 1, 2, . . .} → R be a function given by






In §3.4.1, we mentioned several properties of v. It is not difficult to see that prop-
erties B-D are applicable to the function f as well (simply set the first entry of M to
0 in each of the properties). Moreover, property A immediately implies the following
conversion between f and v:






 = f(M2 −M1, t) +M1 .
We may characterize f via the following recursion. (The proof of this result may be
found in §3.7.2.)











Also, f(m, 0) = min{m, 0}.
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Remark. Using Proposition 3.4.3, it can be easily shown by induction on t that v(0, t) =
f(0, t) ≤ t · bh/(b+ h).
Remark. As a corollary of Proposition 3.4.3, one could tighten the recursive expression
for v such that the value of Z is restricted to a two-point set consisting of (0, 1) or (1, 0).
In particular, the decision space Z ∈ [0, 1]2 in v can be replaced with Z ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
To compute one value of v(M, t), we have now reduced the number of recursive calls
that need to be made from 4t to 2t. Even though it is a large improvement, computing v
in this manner is still prohibitively slow when t is not very small. However, computing v
can be significantly quicker in certain cases, which we will discuss next.
3.4.3 When computing v can be fast
From §3.4.2, we know that the task of computing v(M, t) is the same as the task of
computing f(M2−M1, t). In this section, we focus on computing f(m, t), and show that
it can be done very efficiently in the case when both cost parameters b and h may be
represented as small integral multiples of some common factor. In that case, we may
evaluate any specific f(m, t) in time polynomial in t but exponential in how small the
common factor is relative to b and h. Stronger yet, if b is an integral multiple of h (or
vice versa), we are able to compute full representations of f(·, t), t = 1, 2, . . . , T in time
polynomial in (b/h) and T , after which each evaluation of f(m, t) involves at most two
lookups from a table of values.
Case 1: b and h are small integral multiples of a common factor
When both b and h can be represented by relatively small multiples of a common factor,
i.e., there exists δ > 0 such that b = Kδ and h = Lδ for small positive integers K and L,
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we show that a single evaluation of f(m, t) for fixed m and t can be carried out efficiently.
For this section, without loss of generality, we assume b > h, or equivalently K ≥ L.
For a given value of m and t, we will describe a dynamic programming algorithm to
compute f(m, t) and prove its correctness. Define the set Hi := {m − iKδ,m − (iK −
1)δ, . . . ,m − δ,m,m + δ, . . .m + (iK − 1)δ,m + iKδ}. We begin by computing f(x, 0)
for x ∈ Ht; note that Ht contains 2tK + 1 points. What follows is the general schema:
For i ≥ 0 incrementally, presume that we have computed f(x, i) for x ∈ Ht−i. For each
x ∈ Ht−i−1, we compute f(x, i+ 1). From Proposition 3.4.3,










Since x ∈ Ht−i−1 and also h = Lδ and b = Kδ, it can be shown that each of {x− h, x +
h, x−b, x+b} appearing in the above expression belongs to Ht−i. Hence, the computation
of f(x, i+ 1) requires only the values of f(·, i) which we have already computed. Finally,
we note that when i = t, we compute f(m, t), and the dynamic programming algorithm
terminates.
The dynamic programming algorithm we have described takes O(t2K) to compute
a single f(m, t) value, a significant improvement over the 2t recursive calls indicated in
§3.4.2.
Case 2: b is an integral multiple of h
Computation of f(·, t) may be further improved in the special case where b is an integral
multiple of h, i.e., (b/h) ∈ Z+. In many supply chain settings, b is significantly larger than
h, and thus this assumption is a reasonable approximation. To improve computational
efficiency in this case, we prove that, for each t, f(·, t) is a piecewise-linear function with
all its breakpoints contained in a discrete set, whose size is linear in t. Furthermore, we
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show that the minimum operator in the recursive computation of f(x, t) can be eliminated
by dictating the optimal solution (refer to Eq. (3.6)). We state these results formally in
the following theorem. The proof of this theorem is based on a transformation of the f
function and is not straightforward. Interested readers may refer to §3.7.3 for the details.
Theorem 3.4.4. Let b/h be a positive integer. Then, f has the following properties:
(i) f(·, t) is a piece-wise linear function, where the breakpoints belong to the set
{−tb, . . . ,−2h,−h, 0, h, 2h, . . . , tb}.
(ii) The optimal choice of σ in Eq. (3.6) is -1 if x ≤ 0 and 1 if x ≥ 0 for any t. I.e.,







f(x− h, t) + h
b+h
f(x+ b, t), for x ≤ 0
h
b+h
f(x− b, t) + b
b+h
f(x+ h, t), for x ≥ 0.
As a consequence of Theorem 3.4.4, we can characterize f(·, t) as a single-variable
function for each t, by evaluating f(·, t) only at breakpoints, and the number of such
breakpoints is linear in t. Since an evaluation of f(x, t) for any breakpoint x requires us
evaluate f(·, t − 1) for a constant number (only two) of different parameters, it follows
that using dynamic programming we may compute complete representations of f(·, t)
for t = 1, 2, · · · , T in time polynomial in T , namely on the order of O((b/h)T 2). Part
(ii) of Theorem 3.4.4 is a surprising result that eliminates a minimization operator in
computation, and this result is consistently observed in numerical computations even
when the integrality assumption of b/h is relaxed.
We contrast Theorem 3.4.4 with the results in the previous case where b and h share
a common factor. We showed in the previous case that the problem of computing f(m, t)
for a given pair of m and t can be accomplished in time polynomial in t but exponential
in how small the common factor is relative to b and h. In this case, we have shown
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that when b is a multiple of h we can pre-process and compute all breakpoints and
corresponding values in time polynomial in (b/h) and T , after which any evaluation of
f(m, t) (equivalently v(M, t)) can be done by looking up the values of f(·, t) at the pair
of breakpoints bracketing m and interpolating (or extrapolating if m is less than −tb or
greater than tb). This is a significant improvement in computational complexity over the
previous case. We have also solved the problem of finding which value of σ minimizes the
expression given in Eq. (3.6) based on the value of m only. The results of this section,
however, require that b be an integral multiple of h, a stronger assumption than the
previous case. (We remark that when h is a multiple of b, all the results of this section
remain valid after obvious modification.)
3.4.4 Asymptotic analysis of v and f
We have studied in Sections 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 the conditions under which f (equivalently v)
may be efficiently computed. In this section, we directly analyze the limiting behavior of
v(0, T ) as T → ∞ using a novel approach. The asymptotic behavior we find for v(0, T )
implies that the manager’s optimal regret scales with
√
T . Note that the same observation
about how optimal regret scales had already been made in Cesa-Bianchi et al. [17] for
the case where b = h and in Haussler, Kivinen and Warmuth [38] for more general loss
functions (including the case of b 6= h), where they obtain these results not from directly
analyzing v like we do but by analyzing the performance of non-optimal algorithms that
nonetheless perform well in the long-run. Also note that our direct analysis of v will lead
to a heuristic for computing v that we discuss in §3.5.1.
The outline of our asymptotic analysis is as follows. We define a two-dimensional
stochastic process {Si,t}, which can be thought of as an array of random walk-like single-
dimensional processes, and show how f(m, t) can be expressed in terms of f(St,t, 0)
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(Proposition 3.4.5). This stochastic process under a central limit theorem-type scaling
({S˜i,t}) falls under a class of martingales called zero-mean square-integrable martingale
arrays, and we show that E[f(S˜t,t, 0)] converges to E[f(N(0, 1), 0)], where N(0, 1) is a
unit normal random variable (Proposition 3.4.7). Finally, we relate this back to the f
and v functions as well as JAT (0,0) (Proposition 3.4.8 and its corollaries).
We begin by defining the stochastic process that we will later relate to f(m, r). Let
{St,k : 0 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 0} be a stochastic process given by
St,0 = m for t ≥ 0 and
St,k = St,k−1 +Xt,k(St,k−1) for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t},
where {Xt,k(St,k−1)} are independent random variables such that
Xt,k(m) =

θt−k+1(m)h with probability b/(b+ h)
−θt−k+1(m)b with probability h/(b+ h), and
θk(m) =

1 if bf(m+ h, k − 1) + hf(m− b, k − 1)
≤ bf(m− h, k − 1) + hf(m+ b, k − 1),
−1 otherwise.
(Note that the condition in the definition of θk(m) is equivalent to m ≥ 0 if b is an integer
multiple of h; see Proposition 3.4.3 and Theorem 3.4.4.)
Observe that each Xt,k(m) is a two-point random variable with the expected value of
0. This random variable takes either h with probability b/(b+h) and −b with probability
h/(b + h), or its negative counterpart that has −h with probability b/(b + h) and b
with probability h/(b+ h). This choice is determined by the multiplier θt−k+1(m), which
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depends on the function f(·, k − 1).
The following proposition relates the expected value of this process to f(m, t). The
proof of this proposition is based on induction and the definition of the {St,k} process,
and can be found in §3.7.4.
Proposition 3.4.5. For all t ≥ 0,
E[f(St,t, 0) | St,0 = m] = f(m, t)− t · bh
b+ h
.
While the quantity of our interest is f(m, t), Proposition 3.4.5 shows that it is sufficient
to evaluate the expected value of f(St,t, 0). Thus, we focus our attention to the {St,k}
process. In particular, we proceed to examine the asymptotic behavior of this process
under a central limit theorem-type scaling (i.e., we scale by the reciprocal of
√
t). As is
typical for such results, we normalize the stochastic process such that it has zero-mean.
From the definition, the variance of Xt,k is given by σ
2 := E[X2t,k | St,k−1] = bh, for
any 1 ≤ k ≤ t <∞. Therefore,
t∑
k=1
E[X2t,k | St,k−1] = σ2t .
We define a new stochastic process {S˜t,k : 0 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 0} based on {St,k} by




















We note that this process {S˜t,k} depends on St,0, but we suppress this dependency in our
notation to simplify exposition. We also write X˜t,k in place of X˜t,k(S˜t,k, St,0) when there
is no ambiguity.
To show that {S˜t,k} satisfies certain desirable properties, we remind the reader of the
following definition.
Definition 3.4.6. (Hall and Heyde [36]) Let (Ω, Fˆ ,P) be a probability space and
{Fˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} be an array of sub-σ-fields with Fˆt,k ⊆ Fˆt,k+1 for each t ≥ 1.
We say {Sˆt,k, Fˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} is a zero-mean square-integrable martingale array
with differences {Xˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} if for all t ≥ 1, Xˆt,k is Fˆt,k-measurable with
E[Xˆ2t,k] < ∞ for each 1 ≤ k ≤ t, E[Xˆt,k | Fˆt,k] = 0 for 1 ≤ k ≤ t, and Sˆt,k =
∑
1≤j≤k Xˆt,j
for 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
We are now ready to obtain a series of results that characterizes the asymptotic be-
havior of f(m, t) as t→∞ in terms of the standard normal distribution N(0, 1) and the
f(·, 0) function, where we remind the reader that f(m, 0) = min{m, 0}. (Recall Definition
3.4.1 and Proposition 3.4.3.) These results are listed in Proposition 3.4.7 below. We first
establish, in part (a), that {S˜t,k} satisfies the definition of a zero-mean square-integrable




by applying the Martingale Central Limit Theorem (Theorem 3.7.5 in §3.7.5). In part
(c), we find an asymptotic expression of f(m, t). The proof of part (c) is based on the re-
lationship between f(m, t) and E[f(St,t, 0)] (established earlier in Proposition 3.4.5), and
uses the idea of how an appropriately-scaled version of E[f(St,t, 0)] can be sandwiched
between two expressions involving E[f(S˜t,t, 0)]. In particular, we derive this by splitting
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St,t into two components: its starting initial condition St,0 and the normalized process
St,t − St,0. When scaled by 1/(σ
√
t), in the limit the initial condition vanishes and the
scaled normalized process can be characterized using part (b). (This will have implica-
tions in formulating a heuristic in Section 3.5.1). The proof of Proposition 3.4.7 can be
found in §3.7.5.
Proposition 3.4.7.
(a) The process {S˜t,k,Ft,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} is a zero-mean square-integrable martin-
gale with differences {X˜t,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1}.
(b) For any m ∈ R, E
[
f(S˜t,t, 0) | St,0 = m
]
→ E [f(N(0, 1), 0)].
(c) For any m ∈ R,
lim
t→∞


















Now, having established the asymptotic behavior of f(m, t) as t→∞, we can derive
an asymptotically accurate expression for v(M, t), where M = (M1,M2) ∈ R2. The
relationship between f(M2 −M1, t) and v(M, t) given in Proposition 3.4.2 shows that







t→∞. See §3.7.6 for the complete proof of Proposition 3.4.8.




bh · √t ·
(





≈ − 0.399 .
For any vector M, the above proposition shows that v(M, t) ≈ [bh/(b + h)] · t −√
bh/(2pi) · √t when t is large. Note that this expression is a difference between a linear
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term in t and a square-root term in t. Furthermore, it is independent of M.
As a corollary of Proposition 3.4.8, we can establish an asymptotic expression for the
performance for OPT. The following result provides a lower bound on the limiting regret
of any algorithm A as well as that of OPT. It is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.4.8,
along with Proposition 3.3.2 and Theorem 3.3.3.








Furthermore, the above inequality is replaced by equality for OPT.
The above theorem shows that under the optimal algorithm OPT, for large T the man-




T which is asymptotically accurate. This
difference grows with the square-root of T . Therefore, the per period regret, JOPTT (0,0)/T ,
decreases to 0 as T →∞.
3.5 A heuristic for v
3.5.1 A heuristic for v, and the algorithm APX
So far, we have established that v is quickly computable if the costs satisfy certain inte-
grality conditions (Section 3.4.3) as well as analyzed the asymptotic behavior of v(M, t)
as t grows very large (Section 3.4.4). One remaining issue is the computation of v(M, t)
when neither the aforementioned cost integrality conditions are satisfied nor is t very
large. To address this, we derive here a heuristic for v(M, t), where each evaluation of
v(M, t) is about as fast as evaluating a single value of the unit normal loss function. This
heuristic value for v(M, t) can be used as a replacement for the exact value for v(M, t) in
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OPT (specifically in Eq. (3.5)), and we term the algorithm that results from doing this
APX.
As shown previously, the problem of computing v(M, t) is equivalent to the problem
of computing f(m, t). From Proposition 3.4.5, we decomposed f into two parts:
f(m, t) = t · bh
b+ h
+ E[f(St,t, 0) | St,0 = m] . (3.7)
In Proposition 3.4.7(c), we showed that E[f(St,t, 0) | St,0 = m]/(σ
√
t) converges to
E[f(N(0, 1), 0)], and therefore showed that
lim
t→∞




t · E[f(N(0, 1), 0)] .
This provides a reasonable approximation for very large values of t, but not necessarily














and considering the asymptotic behavior of each component. The left component is a
scaled version of St,t initialized to begin at St,0 = 0, and the right component is the
actual initial condition St,0 = m at the same scaling. The left component converges
asymptotically to the unit normal random variable, N(0, 1). And the right component
goes to zero as t gets very large so we may disregard it in the limit. However, any
reasonable approximation should work well when t is not very large, and it is possible for
the right component to dominate the left one when St,0 is large and t is small.
Hence, in our heuristic we use the asymptotic limit for the left-hand term but retain
the right-hand term. Since the left-hand term converges asymptotically to N(0, 1) and
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the right-hand term contributes m/(σ
√
t), we can “approximate” their sum by the normal
random variable N(m/(σ
√




















It remains to evaluate E[f(N(m/(σ
√




































where the last equality follows from the symmetry of the normal distribution about its
mean. It is a well-established probability result that if a random variable X is normally
distributed with mean λ and variance σ2, we have that E [(X − x)+] = σL((x − λ)/σ),
where L is the unit normal loss function L(x) = E [(N(0, 1)− x)+]. Hence, we may























This gives us the following approximation formula for f(m, t),











Proposition 3.4.2 lets us to convert this into a heuristic for v, i.e.











It is easy to verify that as t→∞, this heuristic value and the actual v(M, t) have the same
limiting value (the one given in Theorem 3.4.9). As stated earlier, APX is the variant of
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OPT that computes the stocking level decision in each period t using this heuristic for
v(M, t) instead of its exact value.
It is not difficult to see that the decisions of APX and OPT converge as t → ∞, so




bh · √T = limT→∞
JOPTT (0,0)√
bh · √T .
In other words, the regret using APX scales in T on the same order as that using OPT.
Additionally, in §3.5.2, we show numerically that the difference in the decisions made
by OPT and APX diminishes as t increases, and are minute even for small t.
3.5.2 Numerical comparison decisions in APX and OPT
Here, we study numerically the decisions made by APX and by OPT for one instance and
contrast how they vary across different values of t. We fix the following model parameters.
Consider some time period t, with the backorder and holding costs being b = 9 and h = 1
respectively, and where expert 1’s decision is ξt1 = 0 and expert 2’s is ξ
t
2 = 1. We consider
three values of t: t = 5, t = 50 and t = 500, corresponding to short term, medium term
and long term lengths of time until the end of the time horizon. From earlier analyses,
for any fixed period t, in that period OPT mixes the decision of the two experts based
on the difference of their accrued costs. Hence, we only vary M1t −M2t , i.e. expert 1’s
accumulated cost minus that of expert 2’s with t periods remaining in the time horizon.
As M1t −M2t becomes more negative, expert 1’s accrued cost becomes lower compared
to expert 2’s and vice versa. We consider how the decisions of APX and OPT vary with
M1t −M2t . The results are shown in Figure 3.2.
We see that APX is a very good approximation for OPT. When t is large (t = 50 or
t = 500), their decisions are practically identical. Moreover, when t is small (t = 5), the
difference between decisions of APX and OPT are minute.
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OPT: stages to go, t=5
APX: stages to go, t=5
OPT: stages to go, t=50
APX: stages to go, t=50
OPT: stages to go, t=500
APX: stages to go, t=500
Figure 3.2: OPT and APX decisions against difference in expert costs, with expert
decisions ξt1 = 0, ξ
t
2 = 1 and costs b = 9, h = 1.
3.5.3 Extending APX to more than two experts
So far, we have assumed that the inventory manager has recourse to the advice of only
two experts. We give a simple example of how APX can be extended to the case with
N = 2k experts for some k > 1. (That N is a power of two is introduced for notational
convenience, and the case where N is not a power of two can be analyzed using the same
idea.) To extend APX to handle N experts, we decompose the problem with more than
two experts into a collection of concurrent two-experts problems. To do so, we construct
a “knockout” tournament tree of experts. In this tree, we begin with N experts, labeled
Λ0,1,Λ0,2, . . . ,Λ0,N , that mimic the decisions of the experts 1, 2, . . . , N of the original
problem. We pair up the experts in a consecutive manner, Λ0,1 with Λ0,2, Λ0,3 with Λ0,4,
and so forth. For each of these pairs Λ0,2j−1 and Λ0,2j, we combine them into a new
expert Λ1,j whose decisions are that of using APX on the two experts Λ0,2j−1 and Λ0,2j.
We continually repeat this pairing and mixing procedure, using the decisions of Λi,2j−1
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and Λi,2j to form a decision for Λi+1,j for each i, until we are at some round i∗ with only
one expert Λi
∗,1. It is clear that each new round has only half the number of experts of
the previous round, so for each i there are N/2i experts of the form Λi,j, and i∗ = log2N .
The algorithm picks the decision of the inventory manager to be the same as Λlog2N,1. We
maintain this tree of experts throughout the time horizon and keep track of each of the
experts’ (Λi,j’s) performance and decisions. As an example, a tournament tree for TRN
when N = 4 is shown in Figure 3.3.
Λ1,2Λ1,1
Λ2,1
Λ0,1 Λ0,2 Λ0,3 Λ0,4
Figure 3.3: TRN tournament tree for N = 4 experts
Call this tournament tree algorithm TRN. Given that TRN has a tournament tree
with log2N levels and uses APX whose regret scales in T the same as OPT (i.e.
√
T ) in









In other words, the regret of TRN is of order log2N
√
T , which is worse than several
existing algorithms to mix N experts for general loss functions (see for example [38])




T . However, this is unsurprising since our goal was
to describe a simple extension of APX to handle more than two agents, and TRN is the
simplest way to do so where the asymptotic behavior can be established immediately from
the previous results in this chapter.
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3.6 Conclusion
There are two main contributions of this chapter. The first is establishing polynomial
time algorithms for computing v in the cases where b and h are small multiples of a
common factor or when one is a multiple of the other. These show that OPT can run in
polynomial time under those conditions. The second is a direct asymptotic analysis of v
that distinguishes itself from prior analyses that rely on examining the limiting behavior
of suboptimal algorithms. Our direct analysis gives us greater insight into the structure
of v(·, t) as t increases, insight that allows us to formulate a heuristic for v and hence a
heuristic version of OPT we call APX. Moreover, a numerical experiment indicates the
decisions of APX are almost identical to those of OPT.
An interesting question is whether the analysis of v in this chapter can be extended
easily to more than two experts. A positive answer would allow for a version of APX with
better performance bounds than the tournament tree version we described, and would also
allow a characterization of when the more-than-two-expert version OPT can be computed
efficiently.
3.7 Additional Proofs
3.7.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
Suppose that in period t, the expert choices are (ξ1t , ξ
2
t ), and the manager decision is yt.
Let ∆i(x), where i = 1, 2, denote the difference in cost between the manager and expert
i in period t when that period’s demand is x, i.e.,
∆i(x) =
(




b(x− ξit)+ + h(ξit − x)+
)
.
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To show the required result, it suffices to show that for any adversarial choice of the
realized demand dt ∈ (0, 1) one of the following holds: (i) ∆i(0) ≥ ∆i(dt) for both
i = 1, 2; or (ii) ∆i(1) ≥ ∆i(dt) for both i = 1, 2. (The proposition follows since the choice
of t was arbitrary; thus, it would also hold for t− 1, t− 2, . . . , 1.)
Without loss of generality, suppose that ξ1t ≤ ξ2t . We consider the following two cases
separately: dt < yt and dt ≥ yt. In the first case dt < yt, from the form of ∆i(x), it follows
that
∆i(0) = (h(yt − 0))−
(
b(0− ξit)+ + h(ξit − 0)+
)
,
∆i(dt) = (h(yt − dt))−
(
b(dt − ξit)+ + h(ξit − dt)+
)
, and
∆i(0)−∆i(dt) = (hdt) +
(




h(ξit − dt)+ − h(ξit − 0)+
)
≥ 0 .
Thus, (i) holds in the first case. A similar analysis shows that (ii) holds in the second
case dt ≥ yt. 
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 3.4.3
If t = 0, then the result that f(m, 0) = min{m, 0} follows from the definition of v((0,m), 0).















b · f(m+ h(Z2 − Z1), t− 1) + h · f(m+ b(Z1 − Z2), t− 1)
b+ h
.
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Since f(m, t − 1) is a concave with respect m for any t (property C), it follows that
we can reduce the feasible set of minimization from [0, 1]2 to its four corner points:
{(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}.
We claim that we can further reduce the feasible set to two points: {(0, 1), (1, 0)}.
To prove this claim, observe that the objective value inside the minimization operator is
simplified to f(m, t − 1) if (Z1, Z2) is either (0, 0) or (1, 1). By the concavity of f with
respect to its first argument (Property C), since m can be written as a convex combination
of m− b and m+ h, it follows that

















· f(m+ h, t− 1) + h
b+ h
· f(m− b, t− 1)
=





Therefore, in the minimization operator above, the choice of (0, 1) dominates both (0, 0)






b · f(m+ h(Z2 − Z1), t− 1) + h · f(m+ b(Z1 − Z2), t− 1)
b+ h
,
which is equivalent to the required result. 
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3.7.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4.4
To provide a simple proof of Theorem 3.4.4, we find it useful to introduce a sequence of
functions {gt : t ≥ 0}, that have one-to-one correspondence with {f(·, t) : t ≥ 0}. Each
gt is symmetric around 0 and has a simpler recursive formulation. We define gt, t ≥ 0, as
follows:
Definition 3.7.1. Let α > 0. Define g0(x) = αx for x ≤ 0 and g0(x) = −αx for x ≥ 0.
For any t ≥ 0, recursively define
gt+1(x) = min{hgt(x− b) + bgt(x+ h), bgt(x− h) + hgt(x+ b)} . (3.8)
In the following proposition, we prove the one-to-one correspondence between gt and
f(·, t).
Proposition 3.7.2. Suppose α = 1/2 in the definition of gt. Then,
gt(x) = (b+ h)
t
[





Proof. It is easy to verify the statement for t = 0. We assume the result for t − 1 and
prove the result for t. From Eq. (3.8),
gt(x) = min{hgt−1(x− b) + bgt−1(x+ h), bgt−1(x− h) + hgt−1(x+ b)} .
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Applying the induction hypothesis to the gt−1 terms,
hgt−1(x− b) + bgt−1(x+ h)
= (b+ h)t−1 [hf(x− b, t− 1) + bf(x+ h, t− 1)− (t− 1)bh− hα(x− b)− bα(x+ h)]
= (b+ h)t
[(












bgt−1(x− h) + hgt−1(x+ b)
= (b+ h)t−1 [hf(x− b, t− 1) + bf(x+ h, t− 1)− (t− 1)bh− hα(x− b)− bα(x+ h)]
= (b+ h)t
[(











Therefore, from the definition of f(x, t) in Eq. (3.6), we obtain Eq. (3.9), which completes
the induction step.
Before proceeding further, we note the following properties of gt. The proofs of these
results are simple, and thus we omit them here.
Assertion 1. For any t, gt is symmetric, i.e., gt(x) = gt(−x).
Assertion 2. For any t, the two arguments of the minimum operator in Eq. (3.8) of
Definition 3.7.1 are the same if x = 0, i.e., hgt(0−b)+bgt(0+h) = bgt(0−h)+hgt(0+b),
for any t.
The following proposition shows some properties of gt, and these properties are similar
to those we want to show for f(·, t).
Proposition 3.7.3. Let b/h be a positive integer. Then, gt has the following properties
for all t ≥ 0.
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(i) gt is a piece-wise linear function, where the breakpoints belong to the set
{. . . ,−2h,−h, 0, h, 2h, . . .}.
(ii) The minimization operator in Eq. (3.8) in the definition of gt+1 can be solved in the
following manner based on the value of x:
gt+1(x) =

bgt(x− h) + hgt(x+ b), for x ≤ 0
hgt(x− b) + bgt(x+ h), for x ≥ 0.
Proof. The base cases of t = 0 and t = 1 can be verified easily. We assume the result for
t− 1 and t and prove the result for t+ 1.
We first consider the case of x ≥ h. Then, since x−h ≥ 0, by the induction hypothesis,
bgt(x− h) + hgt(x+ b)
= bhgt−1(x− b− h) + b2gt−1(x) + h2gt−1(x) + bhgt−1(x+ b+ h)
= h[bgt−1(x− b− h) + hgt−1(x)] + b[bgt−1(x) + hgt−1(x+ b+ h)]
≥ h[gt(x− b)] + b[gt(x+ h)] ,
where the last inequality follows from the definition of gt+1 according to Eq. (3.8). Thus,
we prove (ii) for x ≥ h. By a similar argument (or by Assertion 1 above), we prove (ii)
also for x ≤ −h.
From the above induction argument, it can be verified that (i) also follows for x ∈
(−∞,−h] ∪ [h,∞). Furthermore, from the fact that each of hgt(x − b) + bgt(x + h) and
bgt(x−h)+hgt(x+b) is piecewise-line with the breakpoints in {. . . ,−2h,−h, 0, h, 2h, . . .}
and that these two functions are equal at x = 0, we can obtain that gt+1 is linear in each
of [−h, 0] and [0, h]. Thus, we prove (i) for any x ∈ (−∞,∞).
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It remains to show (ii) for x in the interval (−h, h) only. Since gt+1 is piecewise-linear,
i.e., (i), it suffices to verify this result for x = 0 only. If x = 0, then Assertion 2 shows
the required result for (ii). This completes the induction step.
By the one-to-one correspondence of gt and f(·, t), the properties of gt just shown in
Proposition 3.7.3 have their counterparts for f(·, t). Part (ii) of Proposition 3.7.3 and
Proposition 3.7.2 together imply part (ii) of the required result (stated in Theorem 3.4.4).
Furthermore, since breakpoints of a piecewise linear function are preserved under scaling
and under addition of an affine term, part (i) of Proposition 3.7.3 and Proposition 3.7.2
imply that f(·, t) is a piece-wise linear function, where the breakpoints belong to the set
{. . . ,−2h,−h, 0, h, 2h, . . .}. However, this set is infinite in size. Thus, to prove part (i)
of the required result, it remains to show that this set can be truncated on both sides to
{−tb,−tb + h, . . . ,−h, 0, h, . . . , tb − h, tb}. We accomplish this by showing that, for any
fixed t, f(m, t) is linear in the region m ≤ −tb, and also linear in the region m ≥ tb. This
result, stated in Proposition 3.7.4, completes the proof of Theorem 3.4.4.
Proposition 3.7.4. For any fixed t, f(m, t) is linear in m for m ≤ −tb with gradient 1,
and linear in m for m ≥ tb with gradient 0, i.e.
f(m2, t)− f(m1, t) =

m2 −m1 for m1,m2 ≤ −tb
0 for m1,m2 ≥ tb .
Proof. It is easy to check that the statement holds for t = 0. We assume the statement
holds for t−1, i.e., f(m, t−1) is linear in m with gradient 1 for m ≤ (t−1)b and is linear
in m with gradient 0 for m ≥ (t− 1)b.
We first consider the interval (−∞,−tb). For any m1 and m2 satisfying m1 ≤ m2 ≤
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−tb,
f(m2, t)− f(m1, t) = min
σ∈{1,−1}
{











Note that each of {m1+h,m1+b,m2+h,m2+b} is bounded above by −tb+b = −(t−1)b.
Thus, from the induction hypothesis, we may replace all the f(x, t− 1) terms by a linear
function x+ β, for some constant β. Hence, the above expression can be written as
f(m2, t)− f(m1, t) = (b+ h)(m2 −m1 + β − β)
b+ h
= m2 −m1 ,
proving the first part of the result. The case for m1,m2 ≥ tb is similar, and we complete
the induction step.
3.7.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4.5
The required result is clearly true for t = 0 since both sides are f(m, 0). As an induction
hypothesis, we assume the result for t− 1, and show that it is also true for t ≥ 1.












· f(m+ θt(m)h, t− 1) + h
b+ h
· f(m− θt(m)b, t− 1) . (3.10)
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We turn our attention to E[f(St,t, 0) | S0 = m]. Conditioning it on on Xt,1, we obtain
E[f(St,t, 0) | S0 = m]
= P (Xt,1 = θt(m)h) · E [f(St,t, 0) | St,0 = m,St,1 = m+ θt(m)h]
+ P (Xt,1 = −θt(m)b) · E [f(St,t, 0) | St,0 = m,St,1 = m− θt(m)b] . (3.11)
We simplify the above expression. First, notice that
P (Xt,1 = θt(m)h) =
b
b+ h
and P (Xt,1 = −θt(m)b) = h
b+ h
.
Now, for any 0 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ t, we have (St,k | St,0, St,1, . . . , St,j) = (St,k | St,j) from the
definition of St,k. Therefore, for any α and β, we obtain
E [f(St,t, 0) | St,0 = α, St,1 = β] = E [f(St,t, 0) | St,1 = β]
= E [f(St−1,t−1, 0) | St−1,0 = β]
= f(β, t− 1)− (t− 1) · bh
b+ h
. (3.12)
Above, the second equality follows since the definition of St,k implies (St,k | St,j = α) has
the same distribution as (St−j,k−j | St−j,0 = α) for any α and 0 ≤ j ≤ k ≤ t. The last
equality follows from the induction hypothesis.
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Applying Eq. (3.12) to Eq. (3.11) gives


















· f(m+ θt(m)h, t− 1) + h
b+ h
· f(m− θt(m)b, t− 1)− (t− 1) · bh
b+ h
.
This equation combined with Eq. (3.10) completes the induction step. 
3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4.7
We first establish some properties of the zero-mean square-integrable martingale array.
Let At ⇒ B indicate convergence in distribution of some stochastic process {At} to
some random variable B. We state the following theorem, which is adapted from Corollary
3.2 of Hall and Heyde [36].
Theorem 3.7.5 (Martingale Central Limit). Let {Sˆt,k, Fˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} be a
zero-mean square-integrable martingale array with differences {Xˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1}.














{∣∣∣Xˆt,k∣∣∣ > ε} | Fˆt,k] converges to 0 in probability,
and
(ii) vˆt converges to ηˆ
2 in probability, where ηˆ2 is an almost surely finite random variable
satisfying P(ηˆ2 > 0) = 1.
Then, Sˆt,t/
√
vˆt ⇒ N(0, 1).
We now prove the following corollary of Theorem 3.7.5, which we shall require.
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Proposition 3.7.6. Let {Sˆt,k, Fˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} be a zero-mean square-integrable
martingale array with differences {Xˆt,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1}. Suppose that the conditions
of Theorem 3.7.5 is satisfied. Furthermore, suppose that E[Xˆt,kXˆt,j] = 0 for any 1 ≤ k <









−→E [h(N(0, 1))] . (3.13)
Proof. From Theorem 3.7.5,
Sˆt,t/
√
vˆt ⇒ N(0, 1).
Since h is continuous, by the Continuous Mapping Theorem (see, for example, the corol-







⇒ h(N(0, 1)) .
Thus, if we can prove that {h(Sˆt,t/
√
vˆt) : t ≥ 1} is uniformly integrable, then we obtain
the required result Eq. (3.13). (See, for example, Theorem 25.12 of Billingsley [11].)
For the remainder of the proof, we show the uniform integrability of {h(Sˆt,t/
√
vˆt) : t ≥
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Since E[Xˆt,iXˆt,j] = 0 and vˆt =
∑t
















which is a sufficient condition for the uniform integrability of {h(Sˆt,t/
√
vˆt) : t ≥ 1}.
We now prove Proposition 3.4.7.
Proof of Part (a). Observe that












Therefore, from Definition 3.4.6, {S˜t,k,Ft,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} is a zero-mean square-
integrable martingale with differences {X˜t,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1}.
Proof of Part (b). We first claim that {S˜t,k,Ft,k : 1 ≤ k ≤ t, t ≥ 1} satisfies the
conditions of Proposition 3.7.6. To prove this claim, observe that
∑t
i=1 E[X˜2t,k] = t · 1t = 1,
and that for any  > 0,
E[X˜2t,k · 1{|X˜t,k| > ε}] ≤ E[X˜2t,k] =
1
t
−→ 0 as t→∞.





Hence, we complete the proof of the claim.
From part (a) and the above claim, we may apply the results of Proposition 3.7.6 to
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 −→ E [f(N(0, 1), 0)] ,
which is the required result.
Proof of Part (c). Since Proposition 3.4.5 implies f(m, t)−t · bh
b+h
= E[f(St,t, 0)|St,0 = m],
it suffices to show that
lim
t→∞











Since f(m, 0) = min{m, 0} (Proposition 3.4.3), it follows that f(x, 0)−|y| ≤ f(x+y, 0) ≤
f(x, 0) + |y| for any pair of scalars x and y. Thus,
E[f(St,t − St,0, 0)|St,0 = m]− |m|
≤ E[f(St,t, 0)|St,0 = m]
≤ E[f(St,t − St,0, 0)|St,0 = m] + |m| .
Furthermore, since f(αx, 0) = αf(x, 0) for any α ≥ 0,
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Now, we take the limit of the above inequalities as t → ∞. Part (b) implies




], and also |m|/(σ√t) → 0. Thus, we obtain
Eq. (3.14) and complete the proof.
3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 3.4.8





bh · √t ·
[










= − E [N(0, 1)+] .
where the last equality follows from Proposition 3.4.7, as well as the fact that f(m, 0) =
min{m, 0} (Proposition 3.4.3) and the symmetry of the uniform distribution. It is easy
to verify that E [N(0, 1)+] is 1/
√




In this chapter, we focus on performance guarantees for a classic problem in revenue
management: the single-resource capacity allocation problem under non-monotonic fare
arrivals. We are interested in the relationship between performance (the expected revenue
generated) and the amount of information about demand. In particular, we derive an
explicit lower bound on the amount of demand data required so that a solution policy
derived from that data achieves a specified performance with high probability.
4.1 Introduction
The single-resource capacity allocation problem is one of maximizing expected sales rev-
enue of a limited resource whose price and demand changes with time. The literature’s
resource of choice has traditionally been single-leg flight tickets, but equally applicable
are single-night stays in a hotel and tickets for cruises, sporting and music events. We
use the context of single-leg flight tickets and talk about selling capacity (on the flight)
for different fares.
The time horizon in this problem can be modeled in one of two ways, either time is
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continuous (where price may evolve continuously as well, see e.g. [29]) or time is segmented
into contiguous intervals (where the price is static within each interval).
We focus on the latter model, where the sales horizon is divided into a finite number
of stages. Capacity is sold at a different prescribed fare in each stage. The revenue
manager controls the amount of capacity available for purchase in each stage by deciding
the quantity remaining capacity to reserve for future sales, which is called a protection
level. In each stage, capacity is sold to satisfy demand in each stage until demand is
completely satiated or the remaining capacity is less than or equal to the protection level.
Demand is assumed to be independent across the stages, and the sequence of fares across
the stages can be arbitrary but is known a priori. The goal of the revenue manager is to
set these protection levels in order to maximize expected revenue.
The problem we described is well-understood when demand distributions are known
explicitly. Littlewood [55], Belobaba [7, 8], Curry [23], Wollmer [87], and Brumelle and
McGill [15] analyzed the problem with the assumption that the fares across stages are
monotonically increasing, and found that protection level policies are optimal. Robinson
[70] later showed that even when fares change non-monotonically across stages, protection
level policies were optimal.
What is less understood is the relationship between how much is known about the
demand and the level of performance that knowledge guarantees. One common measure
of information is the number of demand samples available. This measure of information
makes sense when demand patterns are consistent across instances of the problem, say
Friday evening flights on non-holiday weekends between Boston and New York, so samples
would be demand data from ticket sales of these flights. The main results of relevance are
those of Van Ryzin and McGill [83] and Kunnamkal and Topaloglu [50], which describe
stochastic gradient descent algorithms and analyze how quickly the decision parameters
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converge to optimal ones.1 These algorithms iteratively choose a policy, obtain a sample of
the demand distributions, and update the policy according to the outcome. An issue with
the analyses in these studies is that while they relate how quickly the decision parameters
converge to optimal ones, they do not relate how quickly performance converges. In
particular, in instances where performance is insensitive to decision parameters, a wide
range of policies perform close to optimal and a well-performing policy can be found
quickly, even if decision parameters converge slowly.
We attempt to address this gap in understanding using analytical approaches inspired
by Levi, Roundy and Shmoys [52], who analyze multi-stage stochastic inventory problems
and derive bounds on the number of data samples required to generate a provably-good
solution with high probability. The dynamic program they analyze has the feature that
the cost function in each stage is convex in the decision variable if the decisions made
in later stages are optimal. They show that with a sufficient number of data samples, it
is possible to estimate with high probability decisions that preserve this convexity while
performing almost as well as under the optimal decisions. They furthermore extend their
approach to stochastic dynamic programs where the cost function in each stage is convex
or concave in the decision variable. However, their results cannot be directly applied to
the capacity allocation problem since the expected revenue function in each stage of its
dynamic program is not concave in the decision variable. We refer interested readers to
Kunnamkal and Topaloglu [50] for an example that demonstrates this non-concavity.
In order to handle the non-concavity inherent in the capacity allocation problem, we
develop an approach different from that of Levi, Roundy and Shmoys. Instead of attempt-
ing to estimate decisions that enforce concavity of the revenue function in the decision
1One important distinction between their results and ours is that they are able to work with censored
demand samples, while our analysis requires demand samples be uncensored. Another distinction is
that while their results assume fares are monotonically increasing across the stages, we make no such
assumption.
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variable in each stage of the dynamic program, we show it is sufficient to estimate deci-
sions that almost satisfy known optimality conditions for the capacity allocation problem
One interesting consequence of the approach that we take versus that of Levi, Roundy
and Shmoys is that the estimated decisions in their approach must always be greater than
the corresponding optimal decisions, while the estimated decisions in our approach have
no such restrictions.
Our approach to this problem is as follows: we define a class of policies called ε-
backwards accurate policies (for any arbitrary ε > 0), analyze their performance relative
to an optimal policy, and show an explicit bound on number of data samples required to
generated an instance from this class of policies.
ε-backwards accurate policies are approximations of optimal policies in the following
sense: optimal policies can be characterized by a series of equations involving the proba-
bilities of certain events, and ε-backwards accurate policies allow each of these equations
to be off by up to ε.
Characterizing how this class of policies performs is the subject of the first half of
this chapter. We show an upper bound for the maximum regret under an ε-backwards
accurate policy (the absolute difference in expected revenue using it versus using an
optimal policy). We achieve this by comparing a ε-backwards accurate policy to an
optimal one by doing the following period-by-period: start with some remaining capacity,
consider any demand realization in the current period, and the remaining capacities under
both policies given the realized demand, match the capacities under both policies by
adjusting the remaining capacity under the ε-backwards accurate policy, and do some
cost accounting for the adjustment. The total cost accounting gives a bound on the
suboptimality of the ε-backwards accurate policy. We also derive a lower bound for the
expected revenue of an optimal policy by considering alternative policies that only protect
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a given amount of capacity until a certain period and makes all capacity available for sale
thereafter. The upper bound on the absolute gap divided by the lower bound on optimal
expected revenue in turn yields a upper bound for the suboptimality of ε-backwards
accurate policies expressed as a ratio of the optimal performance that is distribution-free.
The second half of the chapter focuses on deriving the number of demand samples
required to generate an ε-backwards accurate policy. We show that a straightforward
Monte Carlo integration algorithm suffices to generate such a policy if it is provided
enough demand samples. In such an algorithm, an empirical probability measure for the
demand distributions is generated from the demand samples, and an optimal solution is
found for the problem using this empirical measure in place of the true one. We lower
bound the number of samples required for this algorithm to compute an ε-backwards
accurate policy to an arbitrary confidence probability.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: we outline the capacity allocation problem
in §4.2 and describe its known optimality results in §4.3. In §4.4, we define ε-backwards
accurate policies and analyze their optimality gap. Finally, in §4.5, we describe a well-
known Monte Carlo sampling algorithm and show when it is given a sufficient number
of samples as inputs, it constructs from samples a ε-backwards accurate policy with high
probability. Additionally, we bound the minimum number of samples required for a policy
computed via this Monte Carlo algorithm to achieve some performance level with a desired
confidence probability.
4.2 Model description
We now describe the model formally. There is x0 capacity of a flight to be sold in M + 1
stages, beginning from stage M + 1 and ending after stage 1. In each stage i, the fare
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charged for a unit of capacity is fi. The fares fi, i = 1, . . . ,M +1, are pre-determined but
need not be monotonic in i. We will refer to capacity sold in stage i (at fare fi) as fare
class i. In each stage i, the revenue manager decides some protection level pi−1 which is
the amount of capacity to reserve for future stages (i.e. all stages j < i). The demand
for capacity in each stage i is Di (which is stochastic in nature) which, depending on the
remaining capacity x and the protection level pi−1, can be either fully or only partially
satiated. In particular, in each stage i, min{Di, x− pi−1} capacity is sold for a revenue of
fi ·min{Di, x−pi−1} and the remaining capacity for future stages is x−min{Di, x−pi−1}.
We assume that each Di has continuous support, finite mean, and cdf Fi (and ccdf F i).
Moreover, the Di’s are mutually independent.
Recall that the manager’s role is to decide the protection levels p0, p1, . . . , pM . Define
pi to be the vector (p0, p1, . . . , pi). We will call these vectors of protection levels protection
level policies, since for any i, pi is a complete description of the decisions that need to
made from stages i + 1 through 1. We will typically define some pM = (p0, . . . , pM) and
use pi to refer to the first i + 1 entries (p0, . . . , pi). (Similarly we might define pˆ
M and
refer to its first i+ 1 entries by pˆi).
For i = 1, . . . ,M + 1, let Wi(p
i−1, x) to be the expected revenue to go from stage i
onwards with x capacity remaining at the beginning of the stage and using the protection
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[firi +Wi−1(pi−2, x− ri)] dFi(ri)
+F i(x− pi−1) · (fi · (x− pi−1) +Wi−1(pi−2, pi−1)) , if x > pi−1,
Wi−1(pi−2, x), if x ≤ pi−1,
(4.1)
Wi(p
i−1, 0) = 0,
W0(·, ·) = 0.
The revenue manager’s objective is to select pM to maximize WM+1(p
M , x).
4.3 Characterizing optimal policies
The structure of optimal policies to the capacity allocation problem is well studied, and in
this section we review the characterization due to Robinson [70]. (For a characterization
of the model where the fares can only increase across stages, see Brumelle and McGill
[15].) We first define some notation that will be used throughout the rest of this chapter.
Definition 4.3.1. Let [i] be the fare class that has the highest fare amongst classes
1, 2, . . . , i, i.e. [i] := argmaxj {fj : 1 ≤ j ≤ i}, so that f[i] = max{fi, fi−1, . . . , f1}. We
term [i] a highest remaining fare class and f[i] a highest remaining fare. Additionally, let
J be the set of highest remaining fare classes, i.e. J := {j : j = [j]}, and Ji be the set of
entries in J that are less than or equal to i, i.e. Ji := {j ∈ J : j ≤ i}.
Definition 4.3.2. For j ≤ i and j ∈ J , piji (pi−1, x) is the probability of a positive stockout
in stage j, i.e. that by the end of stage j all capacity has been sold and there is unsatisfied
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demand in that stage, given that at the beginning of stage i there is x capacity remaining
and the protection level policy pi−1 is used.
We can express piji (p







+ F i(x− pi−1)piji−1(pi−2, pi−1), if i > j and x > pi−1 (4.2)
piji (p
i−1, x) = piji−1(p
i−2, x) if i > j and x ≤ pi−1
pijj (p
i−1, x) = F j(x) (4.3)
piji (p
i−1, x) = 0 if i < j.
The characterization of optimal policies involves non-trivial convex combinations of













fj/f[i], if j = 1,(
fj − f[j−1]
)






i = 1. Moreover, both pi
j
i (p
M , x) and pii(p
M , x) are non-increasing
in x.
We describe several properties of αji that we will use. These properties follow in a
straightforward manner from the definitions.
Proposition 4.3.4. The coefficients αji have the following properties:
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(a) If i 6∈ J , then αji−1 = αji .




















, if x ≥ pi−1,













dFi(ri) + F i(x− pi−1) · fi, if x ≥ pi−1,
∂Wi−1(pi−2,x)
∂x
, if x < pi−1.
(4.7)
A necessary condition for some policy p to be optimal is for Eq. (4.6) to evaluate to
zero for any x, for each i; in turn, Eq. (4.7) must evaluate to fi+1 for x = pi, for each i.
By induction, this requirement can simplified to the following lemma:






One implication of the above lemma is that under an optimal policy, the expected
revenue-to-go at each stage, Wi, is concave with respect to remaining capacity, since
pii(p
∗,i−1, x) is non-increasing in x.
Corollary 4.3.6. Let p∗,M be an optimal policy. For all i, Wi(p∗,i−1, x) is a concave
function in x.
Moreover, applying Eq. (4.8) to Eq. (4.6) implies Wi(p
∗,i−2, pi−1, x) is quasiconcave in
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pi−1. It follows that the necessary condition is also sufficient, which gives us a character-
ization of an optimal policy.
Corollary 4.3.7. Let p∗,M be an optimal protection level policy. Then
fi = f[i−1]pii−1(p∗,i−2, p∗i−1) (4.9)
for all i 6∈ J . Furthermore, p∗i−1 = 0 for all i ∈ J .
Such a characterization of the optimal protection levels provides a recursive definition
of an optimal protection level policy.
4.4 Approximately optimal policies
In this section, we define and analyze an approximately optimal class of policies we call
ε-backwards accurate policies. These are policies that satisfy a relaxed version of the
optimality conditions given by Eq. (4.9). To be more exact, for each i 6∈ J , the convex
combinations of stockout probabilities (pii(·, ·), see Definition 4.3.3) need not be exactly
fi+1/f[i−1] but may deviate by some small ε > 0. However, like an optimal policy, for all
i ∈ J , ε-backwards accurate policies should have pi−1 = 0.
Definition 4.4.1. Let 0 < ε < mink(fk/f[k]). A policy p
M is ε-backwards accurate if
fi
f[i−1]
− ε ≤ pii−1(pi−2, pi−1) ≤ fi
f[i−1]
+ ε (4.10)
for all i /∈ J , and pi−1 = 0 for all i ∈ J .
Remark. We also call some partial policy pi−1 ε-backwards accurate if it is ε-backwards
accurate for a smaller instance of the capacity allocation problem restricted to stages 1
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through i.
The goal of our analysis is to characterize the suboptimality gap of an ε-backwards
accurate policy. To do this, we derive an upper bound for the difference in expected
revenue earned by an optimal policy and an ε-optimal policy (§4.4.2) as well as a lower
bound for the expected revenue earned by an optimal policy (§4.4.3). Combining these
two results (§4.4.4), we can obtain an upper bound on the suboptimality gap as a ratio
of the optimal expected revenue:
Theorem 4.4.2. Let p∗,M be an optimal policy and pˆM be an ε-backwards accurate policy.
The relative gap between the performances of the two policies is
WM+1(p
∗,M , x0)−WM+1(pˆM , x0)
WM+1(p∗,M , x0)
≤ 2Mf[M ]ε
minj 6∈J{fj − 2f[j−1]ε} .
Note that this bound is distribution-free, depending only on the fares and ε.
4.4.1 Subgradient bounds
In this section, we discuss some results concerning the subgradient of the revenue-to-go
function when using ε-backwards accurate policies. These will be used in §4.4.2 and §4.4.3.
We can show that under a ε-backwards accurate policy, the subgradient of the revenue-
to-go functionis the same as that under an optimal policy (see Lemma 4.3.5), but with an
additional error that is homogeneous with respect to ε. This is summarized in the next
Lemma, whose proof is discussed in §4.7.1.









i−1, x) + ε
)
. (4.11)
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From Lemma 4.3.5, ∂Wi(p
∗,i−1, x)/∂x is concave in x and has value f[i]pii(pˆi−1, x).
The key implication of Lemma 4.4.3 is that we can use ∂Wi(p
∗,i−1, x)/∂x in place of
∂Wi(pˆ
i−1, x)/∂x and the error is at most f[i] · ε. This in turns allows us to upper- and
lower-bound the differences in expected revenue-to-go under the ε-backwards accurate
policies at different remaining capacities by using the property that concave functions
have a decreasing subgradient and correcting for the aforementioned error along the way,
which is the subject of the next Proposition.
Proposition 4.4.4. Let pˆM be an ε-backwards accurate policy. For all i 6∈ J :
Wi−1(pˆi−2, b)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, a)

≥ (b− a)fi − 2(b− a)f[i−1]ε, if a ≤ b ≤ pˆi−1,
≤ (b− a)fi + 2(b− a)f[i−1]ε, if pˆi−1 ≤ a ≤ b.















= fi − 2f[i−1]ε,
where the second inequality follows from the non-increasing property of pii−1 (see the
remark following Definition 4.3.3) and the third inequality follows from the definition of
an ε-backwards accurate policy. Therefore, since b ≤ pˆi−1 we have that










≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε) · (b− a).
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≤ f[i−1] · (pii−1(pˆi−2, x) + ε) ≤ f[i−1] ·
(








= fi + 2f[i−1]ε.
Since pˆi−1 ≤ a, it follows that










≤ (fi + 2f[i−1]ε) · (b− a),
as required.
4.4.2 Upper bounding the performance gap
In this section, we upper bound the difference in expected revenue between using an opti-
mal and an ε-backwards accurate policy. We motivate our approach as follows. Imagine
that we are able to implement the two policies side-by-side for the same demand. In each
stage i from M + 1 to 1, the sales quantities to fare class i under the two policies can
either be the same or differ. If they are the same, we take no additional action in this
stage. If they are different, we balance the remaining capacities under the two policies
by “draining” or “filling” the remaining capacity under the ε-backwards accurate policy
as needed to bring it to parity with the remaining capacity under the optimal policy.
Cost accounting is done for this action by crediting or charging the ε-backwards accurate
policy the expected revenue associated with the capacity drained or filled respectively.
The suboptimality gap between the two policies in absolute terms will then be the net
cost incurred via this cost accounting across all stages.
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For concision and ease of exposition, we define a function Hi that is easily validated
to be an upper bound on the difference in capacity sold in stage i by the two policies.
Definition 4.4.5. Let pˆM be an ε-backwards accurate policy and p∗,M be an optimal
policy. Then
Hi(p
∗,M , pˆM , x) :=

min{p∗i−1, x} − pˆi−1, if x > pˆi−1 and pˆi−1 ≤ p∗i−1
min{pˆi−1, x} − p∗i−1, if x > p∗i−1 and pˆi−1 > p∗i−1
0, if x ≤ min{p∗i−1, pˆi−1}.
Moreover, we write Hi(x) in place of Hi(p∗,M , pˆi−1, x) when the context is clear, omitting
the two parameters indicating the protection levels of the two policies.
Note that Hi(p
∗,M , pˆM , x) (or equivalently Hi(x)) is increasing in x, a fact we will
utilize. We now state and prove an upper bound on the revenue difference between using
the two policies.
Theorem 4.4.6. Let pˆM be an ε-backwards accurate policy and p∗,M be an optimal policy.
Then for all i and x ≥ 0,
Wi(p




Proof. We prove this by induction. For i = 1, since 1 ∈ J , p∗0 = pˆ0 = 0, the statement is
trivially true. Suppose that the statement is true for k ≤ i − 1. We show the statement
is true for i.
There are two main cases to consider, and these cases are distinguished by whether
both policies will sell the same amount of capacity to class i demand, or that the two
policies will sell a differing amount of capacity.
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Case 1. ( A. x < min{p∗i−1, pˆi−1}; B. Di < x − max{p∗i−1, pˆi−1} and p∗i−1 6= pˆi−1; or C.
p∗i−1 = pˆi−1.) In this case, both policies sell the same amount of inventory to class i
demand. Since both policies sell the same amount of inventory (possibly zero) in stage
i, in the next stage i − 1 both policies will begin with the same remaining capacity. It
follows that no difference in revenue is accrued in stage i and the difference in expected
revenue-to-go, Wi(p
∗,i−1, x)−Wi(pˆi−1, x), is that of stage i− 1 onwards, i.e.
Wi−1(p∗,i−2, y)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, y)





Since Hk(y) ≤ Hk(x) for all k and Hi(x) ≥ 0, we obtain the required upper bound to
complete the induction step.
Case 2. (p∗i−1 6= pˆi−1, Di > x − max{p∗i−1, pˆi−1} and x > min{p∗i−1, pˆi−1}.) In this
case, the two policies sell differing amounts of capacity to class i demand. We consider
separately the subcases where pˆi−1 < p∗i−1 and pˆi−1 > p
∗
i−1.
Subcase 1. (pˆi−1 < p∗i−1.) Using pˆi−1 as the protection level for this stage, min{(x −
Di)
+, (x− pˆi−1)+} capacity will be sold. Alternatively, using p∗i−1 as the protection level
for this stage, min{(x−Di)+, (x− p∗i−1)+} will be sold. The difference in sales under the
two differing protection levels (the former sales quantity minus the latter) is some strictly
positive value between zero and (max{x, p∗i−1}− pˆi−1). At the beginning of stage i−1, the
remaining capacity is b := min{p∗i−1, x} if p∗i−1 were used in stage i, or a := max{pˆi−1, x−
Di} if pˆi−1 were used in stage i instead. Note that pˆi−1 ≤ a < min{p∗i−1, x} = b. Thus,
using pˆi−1 instead of p∗i−1 for the protection level in stage i would earn (b− a) · fi more in
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revenue but would result in b− a less remaining capacity in stage i− 1. The difference in
the (expected) revenue-to-go function from stage i onwards can thus be expressed as
Wi(p
∗,i−1, x)−Wi(pˆi−1, x) = Wi−1(p∗,i−2, b)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, a)− (b− a)fi .
Subtracting and adding Wi−1(pˆi−2, b) to and from the first and second terms on the right-








By Proposition 4.4.4, the second and third terms can be bounded above by 2ε(b −
a)f[i−1]. From the induction hypothesis, the first bracketed term is bounded above by
2ε
∑i
k=2Hk(b)f[k−1]. Combining these results, we obtain that the above expression is




Hk(b)f[k−1] + 2ε(b− a)f[i−1].
To complete the induction step, it suffices to show that Hk(b) ≤ Hk(x) and (b − a) ≤
Hi(x) := max{x, p∗i−1} − pˆi−1. The first follows from the definition of Hi(·, ·, ·). The
second follows from pˆi−1 ≤ a < b = min{x, p∗i−1}, completing the induction step.
Subcase 2. (pˆi−1 < p∗i−1.) This subcase is similar to the first subcase except that the
policies are reversed. Following the same line of reasoning, we have that the difference in
expected-revenue-to-go function can be characterized by
Wi(p
∗,i−1, x)−Wi(pˆi−1, x) = Wi−1(p∗,i−2, a)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, b) + (b− a)fi,
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for some value of a satisfying p∗i−1 ≤ a < b, where b := min{pˆi−1, x}. Subtracting and




)− (Wi−1(pˆi−2, b)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, a))+ (b− a)fi.
By Proposition 4.4.4, the second and third terms are upper bounded by 2ε(b − a)f[i−1].
From the induction hypothesis, we can upper bound first term by 2ε
∑i
k=2Hk(a)f[k−1].




Hk(a)f[k−1] + 2ε(b− a)f[i−1].
To complete the induction step, it suffices to show that Hk(a) ≤ Hk(x) and (b − a) ≤
Hi(x) := min{pˆi−1, x} − p∗i−1. The former requirement follows from Hi(·, ·, y) being non-
decreasing in y, and the latter requirement follows from p∗i−1 ≤ a < b = min{pˆi−1, x},
which completes the induction step.
4.4.3 Lower bounding the optimal performance
In this section, we develop a lower bound on the expected revenue under an optimal
policy, in particular one with a form that may be utilized together with Theorem 4.4.6 to
give a suboptimality gap that is distribution-free bound. To find such a lower bound, we
construct a sequence of alternative policies. Each policy in the sequence corresponds to
each stage i, and protects an amount equivalent to the higher of p∗i−1 and pˆi−1 until stage
i − 1 and protects nothing thereafter. Each of these policies is feasible, so its expected
revenue is a lower bound for that of an optimal policy. By extension, the maximum of
these lower bounds is also a lower bound for the optimal expected revenue. Note that
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this bound is weak, but is necessary for our purposes.
Lemma 4.4.7. Let pˆM be an ε-backwards accurate policy and p∗,M be an optimal policy.
The expected revenue under the optimal policy,
WM+1(p










Proof. Let R∗(z) = {j ∈ {1, . . . ,M + 1} : j 6∈ J, z > p∗j−1} and Rˆ(z) = {j ∈ {1, . . . ,M +
1} : j 6∈ J, z > pˆj−1}. Recall that Hi(x) = 0 if x ≤ min{p∗i−1, pˆi−1}, and that Hi(x) = 0
for all i ∈ J since p∗i−1 = pˆi−1 = 0 (see Definition 4.4.5). It follows that for any i not in
R∗(x) ∪ Rˆ(x), Hi(x) = 0. Hence, to prove the required result it is sufficient to show for
any i ∈ R∗(x) ∪ Rˆ(x),
WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε)Hi(x) .
We consider three cases: when i ∈ R∗(x) ∩ Rˆ(x); when i ∈ R∗(x) \ Rˆ(x); and when
i ∈ Rˆ(x) \ R∗(x).
Case 1. (i ∈ R∗(x) ∩ Rˆ(x).) In this case, x > max{p∗i−1, pˆi−1}. Recall from Corollary









= f[i−1]pii−1(p∗,i−2, p∗i−1) = fi
where the first equality is due to Lemma 4.3.5, and the last equality is due to Corollary
4.3.7. This implies that Wi−1(p∗,i−2, p∗i−1) ≥ fip∗i−1, which we will transform into an
appropriate bound. Notice that Wi−1(p∗,i−2, p∗i−1) = Wi(p
∗,i−1, p∗i−1) ≤ WM+1(p∗,M , x).
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Moreover, fi ≥ fi − 2f[i−1]ε and p∗i−1 ≥ (p∗i−1 − pˆi−1). Hence,
WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε) (p∗i−1 − pˆi−1) . (4.12)
On the other hand, we have that
Wi(pˆ
i−1, pˆi−1) = Wi−1(pˆi−2, pˆi−1) = Wi−1(pˆi−2, pˆi−1)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, 0).
Applying Proposition 4.4.4 to the right-hand side gives us that
Wi(pˆ
i−1, pˆi−1)











Furthermore, the expected revenue using the optimal policy satisfies
WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ Wi(p∗,i−1, x) ≥ Wi(pˆi−1, pˆi−1), so it follows that
WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε) (pˆi−1 − p∗i−1) . (4.13)
Combining Eq. (4.12) and Eq. (4.13) completes the proof for this case, i.e.
WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε)max{p∗i−1 − pˆi−1, pˆi−1 − p∗i−1} = (fi − 2f[i−1]ε)Hi(x).
Case 2. (i ∈ R∗(x) \ Rˆ(x).) In this case, p∗i−1 ≤ x < pˆi−1. From the definition of Wi and
Proposition 4.4.4,
Wi(pˆ
i−1, x) = Wi−1(pˆi−2, x) = Wi−1(pˆi−2, x)−Wi−1(pˆi−2, 0) ≥ xfi − 2xf[i−1]ε.
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Since x ≥ (x− p∗i−1) = Hi(x), we obtain
Wi(pˆ
i−1, x) ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε)Hi(x).
The optimal policy’s expected revenue satisfies WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ Wi(p∗,i−1, x)




Case 3. (i ∈ Rˆ(x)\R∗(x).) Then pˆi−1 ≤ x < p∗i−1. As similar to Case 1, the combination






It follows that Wi−1(p∗,i−2, x) ≥ fix. Note that WM+1(p∗,M , x) ≥ Wi(p∗,i−1, x)
= Wi−1(p∗,i−2, x), fi ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε) and x ≥ x − pˆi−1 = Hi(x), so we conclude that
WM+1(p
∗,M , x) ≥ (fi − 2f[i−1]ε)Hi(x) as required.
4.4.4 Proving the distribution-free suboptimality gap
We may now prove Theorem 4.4.2. We divide the upper bound for the absolute subopti-
mality gap (Theorem 4.4.6) by the lower bound for the optimal expected revenue (Lemma
4.4.7) to yield a bound for the suboptimality gap as a ratio of optimal expected revenue.
The details are as follows:
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From Theorem 4.4.6,
WM+1(p




≤ 2εMf[M ] max
2≤j≤M+1
Hj(x)
= 2εMf[M ] max
j 6∈J
Hj(x),
where the equality follows from Hj(x) = 0 for all j ∈ J (see Definition 4.4.5) and 1 ∈ J .
Additionally, from Lemma 4.4.7,
WM+1(p














∗,M , x0)−WM+1(pˆM , x0)
WM+1(p∗,M , x0)












which completes the proof.
4.5 Generating an approximately optimal policy
In this section, we show that a straightforward Monte Carlo algorithm suffices to compute
an ε-backwards accurate policy with high probability, as long as it is provided sufficiently
many data samples. Such an algorithm is described in Robinson [70], and is simple enough
that we reproduce it in Figure 4.1.
We can show that if a sufficient number of samples is used, there is only a small
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Input: N demand samples, with Ni samples for each stage i 6∈ J , where∑
i 6∈J Ni = N . Each demand sample is of the form d
t = (dt1, d
t
2, . . . , d
t
M+1) where
dtk is the t-th sample for demand in the k-th stage.
Output: A protection level policy pˆM = (pˆ0, pˆ1, . . . , pˆM)
1. For i = 1 through M + 1 in increasing order:
2. If i ∈ J , set pˆi−1 ← 0. Otherwise do:
3. Initialize zti−1,j ← 0 for t = 1 to Ni and j ∈ Ji−1. For each j ∈ Ji−1:
4. For n = j to i− 1 in increasing order:
5. If zti−1,j ≥ pˆn−1, set zti−1,j ← zti−1,j + dtn.






i−1I{x ≤ zti−1,j} ≤
(fi/f[i−1])}
Figure 4.1: A Monte-Carlo algorithm for computing protection levels.
probability that each of the protection levels found in step 6 of Monte-Carlo algorithm
is outside the acceptable interval of values that correspond to an ε-backwards accurate
policy. The proof for the result uses standard concentration inequality arguments and
interested readers may refer to §4.7.2.
Theorem 4.5.1. For any i 6∈ J , ε > 0, and δ ∈ (0, 1), let N i(ε, δ) := ln(2/δ)/(2ε2). Fur-
thermore, let a given set of protection levels pi−2 := (p1, . . . , pi−2) be ε-backwards accurate.
Suppose the number of samples Ni used to compute pˆi−1 in steps 3–6 of the Monte Carlo
algorithm is at least N i(ε, δ). The policy with pˆi−1 appended, i.e. (p1, . . . , pi−2, pˆi−1), is
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We will use its corollary, given as follows, shortly.
Corollary 4.5.2. The algorithm outputs a protection level policy that is ε-backwards
accurate with probability at least 1− δ, where ε > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), if we provide at least
Ntotal(ε, δ) demand samples to the algorithm, where
Ntotal(ε, δ) = M ln(2M/δ)/(2ε
2).
Proof. From Theorem 4.5.1, if we use ln(2M/δ)/(2ε2) samples to estimate each protection
level (for a total of M ln(2M/δ)/(2ε2) samples used), then with probability (1− δ/M)M ,






where the inequality holds because for any real number y ∈ (0, 1) and strictly positive
integer n, (1− y/n)n > 1− y.
An implication of the above corollary and Theorem 4.4.2 is that we can bound the
number of samples needed to ensure the computed solution is an α-approximation (i.e.
the solution has suboptimality gap as a ratio of optimal performance of at most α) with
a given confidence probability.
Lemma 4.5.3. Consider some α > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1). Suppose we wish to construct
a protection level policy under whose expected revenue is at least (1 − α) of that of an
optimal policy with probability 1− δ. The Monte-Carlo algorithm outputs such a policy if
we use at least
2f 2[M ]M (M + α)
2 · (ln(2M)− ln δ)
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demand samples.
Proof. From Theorem 4.4.2, we see that for an ε-backwards optimal policy pˆM to have
an optimality gap less than or equal to α, we require that
2Mf[M ]ε
minj 6∈J fj − 2f[j−1]ε ≤ α. (4.14)
We claim that choosing any ε such that
ε ≤ αmini 6∈J fj
2(M + α)f[M ]
(4.15)
is sufficient to ensure this. To see this this true, substituting the right-hand side of
inequality Eq. (4.15) for the ε terms in Eq. (4.14), we have that
(
2Mf[M ] · αmini 6∈J fi




fj − 2f[j−1] · αmink 6∈J fk
2(M + α)f[M ]
)
=
2Mf[M ] · αmini 6∈J fi
minj 6∈J 2(M + α)fjf[M ] − 2f[j−1] · αmink 6∈J fk
where the equality follows by multiplying the numerator and denominator by 2(M+α)f[M ].
In the denominator term, we upper bound the f[j−1] term by f[M ] to get that the above
equation is less than or equal to
2Mf[M ] · αmini 6∈J fi
minj 6∈J 2(M + α)fjf[M ] − 2αf[M ] mink 6∈J fk =
α · 2Mf[M ] mini 6∈J fi
2Mf[M ] minj 6∈J fj
= α
which proves our claim.
Choose ε = (αminj 6∈J fj)/(2(M + α)f[M ]). Applying this choice of ε and the required
failure probability δ to Corollary 4.5.2 yields the desired result.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we analyzed a class of near-optimal solutions to the capacity allocation
problem called ε-backwards accurate policies, proved a distribution-free bound on its
suboptimality in terms of ε, and showed that a member of this class can be generated by
a Monte Carlo algorithm given sufficiently many data samples. As a result, we were able
to characterize the relationship between data availability and guaranteed performance,
in the form of the minimum number of data samples required to ensure that solution
generated by the Monte Carlo algorithm is an approximation of a given degree with a
given confidence probability.
We note that in order to derive a sampling bound that is distribution-free, we had to
find a lower bound for the optimal expected revenue in §4.4.3 that is homogeneous in the
difference between the protection levels of the optimal and ε-backwards accurate policies.
Since these differences can be very small, this lower bound is weak. As the sampling
bounds we derive are inversely proportional to this lower bound, we may expect that in
most applications, the number of samples needed to achieve a given performance level can
be much less than the bound we find.
Finally, we had highly leveraged the closed form characterization of the optimal policy,
so it is an interesting question if this approach may also be utilized for other stochastic
dynamic programs with value functions that are non-convex (non-concave) in the decision
variables but have closed form characterizations of their optimal solutions.
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4.7 Additional Proofs
4.7.1 Proof of Lemma 4.4.3
Before we begin, define Λji (p
i−1, x) to be the probability that under using the policy pi−1,
if we had an additional infinitesimal unit at the beginning of stage i, it would be sold at






i−2, x− ri)dFi(ri), if i > j and x > max{pi−1, pj−1}
Λji−1(p
i−2, x), if i > j and pj−1 < x ≤ pi−1
F¯i(x− pi−1), if i = j and x ≥ pi−1
0, otherwise.
Since pˆM is ε-backwards accurate, it follows from the definition that for all j 6∈ J ,
there exists some εj ∈ [−ε, ε] such that
pij−1(pˆj−2, pˆj−1) = (fj/f[j−1]) + εj; (4.16)












where Λji (·) is as defined earlier and Si(x) = {j : j ≤ i, j 6∈ Ji, x > pˆj−1}. Note that
Si(x) is the set of stages for which some sales could be made given that we start stage i
with remaining capacity x and which are also stages that do not correspond to highest
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remaining fares. Since Λji (pˆ
i−1, x) are probability measures of mutually exclusive events





ˆpi−1, x) ≤ 1. Applying this together with
f[j] ≤ f[i] for j ≤ i and −ε ≤ εj ≤ ε, Eq. (4.17) is sufficient to give us the lemma
statement.
We prove Eq. (4.17) by induction. For i = 1, we have 1 ∈ J so by the definition of an




= f1x · dF1(x)− f1x · dF1(x) + F¯1(x)f1 = F¯1(x)f1 = f[1]pi11(x− pˆ0).
Suppose that the proposition is true for all j ≤ i− 1. We will show the proposition is
also true for i. There are three cases to consider: x < pˆi−1 and i 6∈ J (case 1), x ≥ pˆi−1
and i 6∈ J (case 2), and i ∈ J (case 3).




i−2, x) = Λji (pˆ
i−1, x) for all j < i from the definition of Λji . Thus, from



























where the last equality follows from the definition of pii−1. Since i 6∈ J , we have that
αji−1 = α
j
i from Proposition 4.3.4. Moreover, since x ≤ pˆi−1, we have that piji−1(pˆi−2, x) =
piji (pˆ
i−1, x), which follows from the definition of piji . Note that [i] = [i − 1] so Ji = Ji−1.
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Additionally, since x < pˆi−1, Si(x) = {j : j ≤ i, j 6∈ J, x > pˆj−1} = {j : j ≤ i − 1, j 6∈












completing the induction step for i.
For the remaining cases 2 and 3, we have that x ≥ pˆi−1. For case 2, this is implicit in
the case statement. For case 3, this is because for all i ∈ J , pˆi−1 = 0 from the definition






































where the second equality is from substituting the first-order derivative term using the
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induction hypothesis for i− 1 and the third equality follows from a rearrangement of the
terms. Using the property that j ∈ Si−1(x−ri) if and only if j ∈ Si−1(x) and x−ri > pˆj−1,















































+ F¯i(x− pˆi−1)fi. (B)
Case 2. (i 6∈ J, x ≥ pˆi−1.) If i 6∈ J , [i] = [i − 1], which implies that Ji−1 = Ji and
αji−1 = α
j
i . Additionally, from Eq. (4.16),






i−2, pˆi−1) + f[i−1]εi,
where the last equality follows from the definition of pii−1 and [i] = [i− 1]. Thus Eq. (B)
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satisfies






i−2, pˆi−1)F¯i(x− pˆi−1) + f[i−1]εiF¯i(x− pˆi−1).




























































from the definition of Λii. Now we combine the above expressions for Eq. (A1), Eq. (A2)
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where the last equality follows from the recursive definition of pii(pˆ
i−1, x). This completes
the induction step.
Case 3. (i ∈ J .) If i ∈ J , pˆi−1 = 0. This allows us to rewrite Eq. (A1)+Eq. (B) as
∫ x
0






























i = 1 from the definition
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where the first equality follows from the definition of piii = F¯i(x), and the last equality
follows from the definition of pii. Furthermore, since i ∈ J , we have that Si(x) = {j :
j ≤ i, j 6∈ J, x > pj−1} = {j : j ≤ i − 1, j 6∈ J, x > pj−1} = Si−1(x), so we may rewrite






which completes the induction step for i. 
4.7.2 Proof of Theorem 4.5.1
In the proof, we will use Hoeffding’s inequality, a standard concentration inequality.
Lemma 4.7.1 (Hoeffding Inequality, [40]). Let X1, . . . , XN be i.i.d. one-dimension ran-
dom variables such that P (X1 ∈ [α, β]) = 1 for some α < β. Then, for any ε > 0, we
































Proof of Theorem 4.5.1. Since pi−2 is fixed, we omit that parameter in all references to
pii−1(·, ·) in this proof. We show that with sufficiently high probability, that protection
level pˆi−1 falls within an interval [q1, q2] that preserves ε-backwards accurateness for the
policy (pi−2, pˆi−1). More formally, these interval end-points q1 and q2 are given by
q1 := inf
{





x ≥ 0 : pii−1(x) ≥ (fi/f[i−1])− ε
}⋃{0}).
It is straightforward to verify that both quantities are well-defined and q1 ≤ q2.
Let S(i − 1, j, x) be an indicator for the event that there is a positive stockout by
stage j when there is x capacity remaining at the beginning of stage i− 1 while using the




αji−1S(i− 1, j, x).
From the definition of pii, pi
j
i and S, we see that pii(x) = E[G(x)]. Consider step 6 of
the algorithm. Each zti−1,j, where j ∈ Ji−1 and t = 1, . . . , Ni, gives the largest remaining
capacity at the start of i − 1 that results in a positive stockout by stage j when the





i−1I{x ≤ zti−1,j} is a realization of the random variable G(x), corresponding
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is the function pii−1(x) evaluated under the empirical probability measure induced by the
Ni demand samples d
t
i, t = 1, . . . , Ni. Moreover,
pˆi−1 = inf
{




and pˆii−1(·) and pii−1(·) satisfy the conditions Hoeffding’s Inequality.
Before proceeding, note that the complement of the event [q1 ≤ pˆi−1 ≤ q2] is
[q1 > pˆi−1]
⋃
[q2 < pˆi−1]. We show that the probability of the event [q1 > pˆi−1]
⋃
[q2 < pˆi−1]







and that this larger event occurs with probability at most δ.
Since pˆii−1 is a decreasing function, we have that q1 > pˆi−1 implies





the event [q1 > pˆi−1]. Now, let q2 < pˆi−1. Since pˆi−i is the smallest number such that any
other number x strictly smaller than it must satisfy pˆii−1(x) > fi/f[i−1], it follows that q2 <










contains the event [q1 > pˆi−1]
⋃
[q2 < pˆi−1].
It remains to show the larger event occurs with probability at most δ.
As pˆii−1(y) ∈ [0, 1] for any y, applying the lower bound and upper bound portion of
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Hoeffding’s Inequality to the random variables G(q1) and G(q2) respectively, we have that













Y − pii−1(q1) ≤ fi/f[i−1] − pii−1(q1) ≤ −ε, where the second inequality follows from the






≤ P (pˆii−1(q1) ≤ pii−1(q1)− ε)
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